The Connection of Eastern and Central Cilicia with Piracy

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The reason for the negative image of Cilicia and Cilicians in the Late Hellenistic period was the identification of the region with piracy. Some accounts of ancient writers on the image of the Cilicians are very striking. For example, Lucian clearly underlined the image of Cilicia in Antiquity by saying, "Cilicians rob, Phoenicians trade and Egyptians cultivate".

The gangs called the Cilician pirates gained in power so much as of the mid-2nd century B.C. that they were able to bring to a halt the grains transportation to Rome, almost leading her to starvation. It is also told that the Romans were not able to set sail for any activity in this period. Among other striking points can be cited the halt of trade for the most of the year; military transportation could be handled only in the winter months when pirates set sail less frequently; even the connections with the eastern provinces came to the point of breaking away².

The geography where such a power group was positioned has been an issue of hot debate for some time. The most widely accepted view today is that the pirates were positioned along the coasts of Lycia and Pamphylia. Western Rough Cilicia where Coracesium is located was also among their important centres.

Central and eastern Rough Cilicia (the coast in which Anemurium, Nagidos, Kelenderis, Aphrodisias, Seleukeia and the Olba priest-kingdom follow each other towards the east, Fig. 1), however, are considered outside the area of pirates' range and various authors claim that piracy should not be considered active to the east of Pamphylia, Anemurium or Calycadnus. Moreover, based on a statement by Strabo, some scholars have also commented that piracy did not have a big impact on the locals of the region in question³. This statement says, "Seleuceia, a city standing far aloof from the Cilician and Pamphylian usages"⁴. In fact, if a connection needs to be built between this statement by Strabo and piracy then it will be more correct to say that piracy existed both in Pamphylia and Cilicia and it may have developed in some areas outside Seleuceia. Furthermore, piracy and

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¹ Lucian Ica. 16, 771.

² Maroti 1970, 489 ff.

³ Rauh 1997, 269.

⁴ Strabo XIV.V.4.

pirates were not stationary. They were encountered across a wide area, constantly expanding during their era of growth. It is understood that the area of pirates' presence changed and shrank thanks to the attempts by the Romans launched in various times. Thus, it will lead to mistakes if one considers that the pirates had positioned themselves always within the same region through the ages.

As inferred, it is vague whether central and eastern Rough Cilicia were within the active areas of the pirates, or these regions were included within the eastern boundary of piracy. The most important reason for this vagueness is the absence of enough records on the cities in this geography. A second important reason for vagueness is that the borders of Cilicia changed quite frequently and that parts of Pamphylia, Lycaonia, Cappadocia and Pisidia were also included within Cilicia at a certain time⁵. Therefore, it is not understood clearly exactly which geography Cilicia covered. Consequently, the spread of piracy in Cilicia is sought to be explained with the interpretations of modern scholars.

If central and eastern Rough Cilicia were in alliance with Rome in her struggle against the pirates, then one would expect to see some records of it reflected in the accounts of ancient writers. In fact, the situation is just the opposite. It would be more realistic to expect that the economic problems increasing with the increasing pressure of the Mithridatic wars and Rome's policy of pressure would more probably have led the people of central and eastern Rough Cilicia to the point of revolt against Rome⁶. The people of Rough Cilicia had served as mercenaries in the Hellenistic period,⁷ but with the decline of the Hellenistic kingdoms they lost this chance and were forced to make another choice after the settlement of the Romans in Anatolia⁸. Therefore, in the Late Hellenistic period when there was no big power to stand against the pirates, there was no apparent reason for the people of central and eastern Rough Cilicia not to collaborate with the pirates9. Besides, it is known that the pirates treated grimly those who were not their own, but acted in solidarity with those supporting them, and that they supported each other economically or militarily even when they did not know each other 10. Thus, the claims that the eastern border of the region, where pirates are encountered should be in Pamphylia, Anemurium or Calycadnus, remain ungrounded. This article aims at re-evaluating the opinions regarding the areas of expansion of pirates.

Central Rough Cilicia in Light of Archaeological Evidence

Excavations conducted at Nagidos, an important city in central Rough Cilicia, showed that the city was abandoned toward the mid-2nd century B.C. Work at the acropolis brought to light material evidence from each period up to then but nothing from thereafter.

⁵ Syme 1939, 299 ff.; Magie 1950, 285, 1162 ff.; Rostovtzeff 1953, 975; Sherwin-White 1976, 10; Syme 1979, 120; Kaya 2005, 18.

⁶ For information and literature on Dolabella and Verres robbing many cities and temples on the coasts close to Rough Cilicia in 80-78 B.C. and thus causing the locals to hate Rome, see Sherwin-White 1976, 10; Arslan 2003, 100.

For mercenary Cilicians, see Liv. XXXVII.40.4, 14; App. Syria. 32; Polyb. XXX.III.25; Jones 1971, 198, 369; Russel 1991, 285; Launey 1950, 476-81; 1067-68; 1225-26.

⁸ Adak 2006, 117.

⁹ Indeed there is a very sharp and true definition that mercenaries and piracy reflect the same geography; see Pritchett 1991, 315.

¹⁰ Maroti 1970, 492; Pohl 1993, 165 ff.

As this period also overlaps the time when piracy started its rise, it is possible that the two developments were linked to each other¹¹.

Kelenderis also exhibits an extraordinary state for this period. Although the depression at Kelenderis is not as dramatic as that at Nagidos, it is seen that all sorts of archaeological evidence diminished considerably¹².

Archaeological materials start to increase again as of the Early Imperial period. It is inferred that the people of Kelenderis returned to their homes when the danger was gone. However, this is not valid for Nagidos, which suggests that this city was abandoned in mid-2nd century B.C. in response to the danger of piracy.

It is not possible to answer the query for a similar hiatus in the other ancient cities of the region for there is no other excavation going on; however, this parallelism observed at Nagidos and Kelenderis points to the presence of a common problem spread across a wide region.

Eastern Rough Cilicia in Light of Archaeological Evidence

The Temple State of Olba was located in the east of Rough Cilicia and had a structure of its own different from other city-states elsewhere. Ruled by a religious authority, the region was in a position to dominate the commercial and military roads in the East Mediterranean. When the Olba region came under Seleucid rule in the early 3rd century B.C., foundations for good relations with the Seleucid State were laid¹³. Besides, Seleuceia¹⁴ founded by Seleucus I Nicator in the same geography increased the importance of the region.

It is understood that Olba was important with its political and military power in addition to being a religious centre. As a matter of fact, the term "Priest Dynasty of Olba" is used for describing the administrative system in Olba¹⁵.

Some available evidence indicates that Olba had an important political position in Rough Cilicia and the role of the religious mission cannot be ignored for this importance. However, another point worth noting here is that Olba is spread across an area much wider than that of a city. Thus, it may be suggested that it had a bigger population and thus a bigger military power.

The high number of and locations of military constructions erected in the first half of the 2^{nd} century B.C. provide us with some evidence regarding the military discipline and strategies 16 . Putting all these together, it is appropriate to define the Priest Dynasty of Olba as a strategic power with religious and military importance.

¹¹ Durukan 2005a, 9; Durukan 2007, 241.

Worth noting is the book on Kelenderis by Prof. Dr. Levent Zoroğlu that mentions numerous finds from all the periods but the low number of finds or their absence for the second half of the 2nd century B.C. and the first half of the 1st century B.C.; see Zoroğlu 1994. This is a sign for the extensiveness of the problem across the region.

An inscription on the peribolos wall of Zeus Olbios Temple placed by the priests of the temple contains a statement documenting the good relations between Seleucus I Nicator and Olba's people; see Heberdey – Wilhelm 1896, 85 ff., inscription nr. 166; MacKay 1990, 2087; Durugönül 1998, 84. This inscription was taken as a criterion for the dating of the temple until recently when it was re-evaluated as a "retrospective honouring"; see Durugönül 1995, 76. Based on a stylistic analysis of the column capitals it was claimed that the temple could not date before 250 B.C.; see Rumscheid 1994, 33, 86-91.

¹⁴ MacKay 1968, 80; Jones 1971, 198.

¹⁵ MacKay 1968, 80.

¹⁶ Durugönül 1998, 119 ff.

The stagnation observed as of mid-2nd century B.C. in central Rough Cilicia is observed similarly at Olba and environs but at a different phase. This phase corresponds to the first half of the 1st century B.C. and is evidenced by a period of chaos during the rule of the Priest Dynasty of Olba and a serious stagnation in especially the architecture¹⁷. The reason for this stagnation could be the spread of piracy in the East Mediterranean.

Under these circumstances, it should be investigated whether or not there were members of the Priest Dynasty of Olba among the Cilician pirates and if so, when and under what conditions they acted together with the pirates.

Emergence of Piracy and Attitude of the People of Rough Cilicia

For the late 3rd and early 2nd century B.C., when Olba region was under Seleucid rule while the rest of Rough Cilicia was under Ptolemaic domination, there is not satisfactory evidence regarding the political, military and economic relations between these neighbouring regions; however, it is inferred that piracy had not yet expanded greatly.

After 188 B.C., which can be considered the beginning of the decline of the Seleucid State, piracy activities started to increase. In this period, piracy was a powerful weapon used by rival states against each other 18; and this is especially true for the relations between the Seleucids and Ptolemies. Especially after the Treaty of Apameia the Seleucid State became the target of pirates and thus started to fight against them. The pirates reported to have organised themselves by Diodotus Tryphon at Coracesium in 139 B.C. 19 were exploited against the Seleucids with support provided by Rome, Egypt and Rhodes in the 2nd century B.C. and they thus flourished 20.

Toward the end of the century, Rome became the principal target of the pirates²¹ and no safe area was to be found in the East Mediterranean²². It was an important milestone for the pirates to have picked Rome as their new target because this arose, as mentioned above, in reaction to the heavy taxes Rome collected from the people and the pressure exerted on the people by the Roman administrators. Besides, this also paved the way for many Anatolian peoples to band up together with the pirates around Mithridates, the king of Pontus, against Rome²³.

¹⁷ Durukan 2003, 222; Durukan 2005b, 51.

¹⁸ For the role of pirates in Hellenistic navies, see Rauh 1997, 271 n. 39.

¹⁹ Strabo XIV.V.2; Plut. Pomp. XXVII.1; Ormerod 1924, 204.

Rostovtzeff, 1953, 784; Sherwin–White 1976, 3; Rauh 1997, 272; Desideri 1991, 301. Contrary to these interpretations, there are opinions claiming that there was no reason for Rhodes to show tolerance toward the pirates and the account of Strabo is not clear; see Berthold 1984, 230 n. 43. However, it is known that rival states collaborated with pirates in order to debilitate each other. Indeed, the Seleucids in alliance with the Macedonians collaborated with the pirates in order to push the Ptolemies away from the Aegean; see Şahin 1994, 4 ff.

Piracy became unbearable for Rome in this period. For this reason, the Senate decided to send Marc Antony to the south coast of Anatolia; see Ormerod 1924, 208; Syme 1939, 299 ff.; Broughton 1946, 35 ff.; Magie 1950, 283; Jones 1971, 201; Garlan 1975, 36; Green 1990, 557.

An inscription from Cnidus dated to the end of the 2nd century B.C. refers to the issue of acting together by big powers such as Rhodes, Cyprus, Cyrene, Syria and Egypt against this threat; see Hassal et al. 1974, 195 ff. esp. 207; Sherwin–White 1977, 69 ff. There is also an opinion that Rhodes was the only power trying to stop the pirates in this period; see Berthold 1984, 228.

²³ For the development of piracy in Cilicia as an economic and political reaction against the Roman occupation and exploitation, see Pohl 1993.

In the battle between the Seleucid King Antiochus VII and the pirates led by Diodotus Tryphon in 139 B.C., the Seleucids had the victory²⁴ which signifies that the state was still powerful enough. This event shows that, in 139 B.C., the pirates had established their activities in an organized manner within the uncontrolled region to the west of the Olba Kingdom²⁵ and that Olba could not act on its own officially independent from the Seleucids. Later, in 95-94 B.C., Seleucid coins were struck at Seleuceia or Elaiussa, which also indicates that the Olba region was still in close contact with the Seleucids²⁶.

In 102 B.C., the Roman Senate declared Cilicia to be a *provincia militaris*²⁷ but following this announcement it is seen that the declaration remained in theory for Rough Cilicia for a long time to come, ²⁸ as understood from powerful armies sent quite often from Rome to break down the piracy.

It is observed that the Seleucids started to lose their dominion over Rough Cilicia toward the end of the 90s B.C.²⁹ and in 83 B.C., Armenian King Tigranes pacified the Seleucid State entirely³⁰. Establishment of full Roman control over Rough Cilicia cannot be claimed in that period, thus pointing to a serious lack of authority in Rough Cilicia including Olba region as of the 90s B.C.

As is widely known, piracy was eradicated by Pompey with his successful campaign in 67 B.C³¹. It is known that, prior to this campaign, the western part of Rough Cilicia was under the control of the pirates while the interior part was dominated by bandits³². Moreover, it is also thought that the primary areas of pirate influence stretched from the eastern coasts of Lycia to Coracesium and environs³³. However, as stated above, the archaeological evidence disappears as of mid-2nd century B.C. in central Rough Cilicia, and cities like Kelenderis and Nagidos fall into a period of darkness. The same scene appears for Olba region about the beginning of the 1st century B.C. This period of hiatus emerging after a grand past indicates that the serious problems experienced in the entire region also affected the Olba region, although with some delay.

Strabo states that the region was under a hereditary rule as of the reign of Seleucus Nicator³⁴. Although it is not clear exactly which region Strabo intended, the Olba region, for instance, is part of this sweep³⁵. However, there is no detailed information regarding the foreign policy of the local rulers of the Olba Kingdom as of the early 1st century B.C. In fact, the same vagueness is valid for many other cities in central Rough Cilicia. The

²⁴ Strabo XIV.V.2; Ormerod 1924, 204; MacKay 1968, 89; Magie 1950, 1160.

²⁵ Pohl 1993, 126 ff.; Durukan 2005a, 10.

²⁶ MacKay 1968, 90, n. 43. For a discussion on the minting city of these coins, see Tekin 1997, 155.

²⁷ Levick 1967, 20 ff.; Jones 1971, 201; Shaw 1990, 220.

²⁸ Magie 1950, 285 n. 15; Ramsay 2000, 107.

The last pieces of evidence regarding the Seleucid rule over the Olba region are the coins dated to mid-90s B.C. thought to have been minted at Seleuceia or Elaiussa; see MacKay 1968, 90. Furthermore, for the exhaustion of the Seleucid power in the last quarter of the 2nd century B.C., see Sherwin-White 1977, 67.

³⁰ Magie 1950, 296; Downey 1963, 68; Sullivan 1990, 102 ff.

³¹ For Pompey's eradication of the pirates, see Magie 1950, 298 ff; Jones 1971, 201.

³² Ormerod 1922, 35 ff.; Keyser 1997, 64 ff.; Rauh 1997, 269; Adak 2006, 117.

³³ Ormerod 1922, 42.

³⁴ Strabo XIV.V.2.

³⁵ Magie 1950, 281.

only bit of information we have is that Kelenderis supported with ships the campaign of Servilius Vatia³⁶. However, this aid does not shed a clear light on the policy of Kelenderis before the arrival of Servilius Vatia in the region because the same inscriptions also state that Side and Phaselis also provided aid to Servilius Vatia. However, Side and Phaselis are known to have been in close contact with pirates formerly. Therefore, it is not clear whether or not Kelenderis had also previously had such contact.

For the first three decades of the 1st century B.C. there exists no evidence that the Roman generals sent to the region managed to gain control of entire Rough Cilicia³⁷. Especially for the fact that the region encompassed a wider geography reaching up to Lycia, it is not clear whether or not the pirates settled themselves in central and eastern Rough Cilicia. It is also thought that the Roman generals did not carry out any activity in central and eastern Rough Cilicia.

In short, despite some evidence regarding the spread of piracy in the period from the 90s to 67 B.C., it has not been possible to shed satisfactory light on the activity in period.

In this atmosphere of vagueness Servilius Vatia launched his successful campaign into Isauria from 78 to 75 B.C. As this campaign focused on Isauria, it is possible that the pirates were actually feeding on Isauria for their purposes³⁸. The real question rises after this successful campaign: Where did the pirates take refuge or hide themselves then? In this phase, it is known that the pirates retreated westward and moved their main base to Crete³⁹. However, also in the same period there is a bit of information indicating that the south coastline of Anatolia and especially the Olba region came under the rule of pirates⁴⁰. This is quite likely because peace could not be settled in Rough Cilicia following the campaign of Servilius Vatia and piracy continued⁴¹.

Area Where Piracy Spread in its Last Phase

For an eight-year period from 75 B.C. up to the campaign of Pompey, there are important clues in the Olba Kingdom that may shed light on the pirates in Rough Cilicia. Indeed, the history of the Olba Kingdom begins to blur as of the end of the 2nd century B.C. On the other hand, Ormerod, who carried out an extensive study on pirates, states that there is little information on piratical activities, especially in the 35 years following the death of Diodotus Tryphon, and that the evidence pointing to Servilius Vatia's involvement in Rough Cilicia during his campaign is not sufficient⁴². This comment influenced later researchers as well and was taken to mean that central Rough Cilicia and Olba region

³⁶ Zoroğlu (1994, 23) mentions that an inscription on this issue was published in 1882. For such an aid of Kelenderis to Vatia, see Rostovtzeff 1953, 949.

³⁷ Keyser 1997, 76; Ormerod 1922, 44, 51; MacKay 1968, 95.

Although some sources underline that no connection must be established between the pirates and the Isaurians (Rauh 1997, 270), the fact that Servilius Vatia had turned his entire attention to the Isaurians suggests that we should be sceptical about this point. It is natural that the Cilician pirates recruited men from numerous coastal towns; however, this must not mean that they did not make use of Isauria which lay very close to their centre. For more information on the fact that Servilius Vatia launched this campaign in order to break the manpower supply of the pirates, see Keyser 1997, 76.

³⁹ Ormerod 1924, 225 ff.; Maroti 1989, 314 n. 25.

⁴⁰ Strabo XIV.V.10.

⁴¹ Ziebarth 1929, 34 ff.; Shaw 1990, 221.

⁴² Ormerod 1924, 205, 215.

were never involved with pirates through the ages⁴³. However, there are signs pointing to the appearance of piracy in the Olba region after the campaign of Servilius Vatia. Determination of the area where piracy spread in this period, although it might be looked upon as a lesser detail, in fact bears importance for the history of the region and of entire Mediterranean. In short, the issue of piracy following the campaign of Servilius Vatia should be evaluated also in this sense.

In his study on social and economic structures of Antiquity, Rostovtzeff focuses on the overall activities of Cilician pirates in his chapter on pirates. Some of his comments reveal clues that he is of the opinion Pamphylia constitutes the eastern border of piracy. For example, in one paragraph he states: "It is well known that the name 'Cilicia' given to the new Roman province was in fact a misnomer. The province in its early days consisted of certain parts of Phrygia, Pisidia and Pamphylia, of the Milyas, and nominally of Lycia. Cilicia proper was added to this administrative unit by Pompey after he had crushed the Cilician pirates..."⁴⁴. In another paragraph he states that piratical activities intensified especially around Side and that there was no other power to stop the pirates after the break of Seleucid dominion in these waters – rather on the contrary, Ptolemies and Cypriots were especially content with the situation⁴⁵. From these statements and his work in general, it is inferred that Rostovtzeff was of the opinion that the centre of piracy should not be considered outside Lycia-Pamphylia.

Based on these authors, it is possible to state that Isauria and western Rough Cilicia (i.e. Coracesium region) were certainly under the control of the pirates and bandits while central Rough Cilicia (i.e. Anemurium, Nagidos and Kelenderis and environs) and Olba region were at the least encircled by these pirates and bandits⁴⁶.

Isauria is located directly north of central Rough Cilicia. The people living in this region are known, through the campaign of Servilius Vatia and the accounts of various written sources, to be dangerous⁴⁷. Even only this context suggests a possibility that "some communities" living in Olba and central Rough Cilicia regions may have had connections with the pirates because the pirates had plundered about 400 cities on the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, capturing some of them⁴⁸.

It will not be a realistic approach if one thinks that such a powerful group did not have connections with the people of a region so close to their core areas. Therefore, it is highly likely that a mass of people in central and eastern Rough Cilician settlements located close to Coracesium and Isauria joined the pirates. Indeed, piracy was considered an honourable profession in this period and it presented new chances to the Cilician sailors, who were going through difficulties thanks to the havoc. Furthermore, a point that should be kept in mind is that piracy appeared in the former Seleucid waters which could not be guarded

⁴³ For opinions that central Rough Cilicia and Olba did not have connections with piracy, see MacKay 1968, 89; Rauh 1997, 269.

⁴⁴ Rostovtzeff 1953, 975.

⁴⁵ ibid 1953 784

⁴⁶ As inferred from the campaign of Servilius Vatia, the pirates had serious connections with Isauria. For more information on the campaign of Vatia, see Ormerod 1922, 35 ff.; Keyser 1997, 64 ff. Regarding the connection between the pirates at sea and the bandits in the mountains, see Rauh 1997, 269 ff.; Adak 2006, 117.

For more information and literature, see Magie 1950, 1170; Keyser 1997.

⁴⁸ Plut. Pomp. XXIV.

any more after the Seleucid navy was abolished under the Treaty of Apameia. This area started from the territorial waters of Plain Cilicia and extended up to Lycia in time, thus placing central Rough Cilicia and Olba region in the midst of this uncontrolled area⁴⁹.

Following the settlement of Roman forces under the supervision of Sulla⁵⁰, Rome pursued a harsh policy to collect taxes in Anatolia, all of which led to hatred of the Romans in general⁵¹. This development serves as additional support for the likelihood that some people from central and eastern Rough Cilicia may have engaged themselves in connections with the pirates.

In this period, the Romans were the common enemy of the pirates, the Pontus State and many Anatolian cities⁵². Decline of Roman authority in Anatolia due to the Civil War in Italy; decline of the Seleucid State approaching its end; rise of the Pontus State as a saviour against the despot-like attitude of Rome; and the agreement between the Pontus State and Cilician pirates – all took place at about the same time⁵³. Again in this period, Zenicetes, the leader of the pirates, declared his kingdom in eastern Lycia and western Pamphylia⁵⁴. Consequently, it hardly seems likely that the peoples of central Rough Cilicia and Olba regions, which went out of control, could assume an attitude against the pirates, not join them or act independent of them⁵⁵.

Again in the same period, generals like Sulla, Servilius Vatia and Lucullus attained serious victories in their struggle against Pontus and her allies in the regions of Pamphylia, Lycia, Lycaonia, Pisidia, Cappadocia and even Phrygia⁵⁶. Rome managed to conquer important cities such as Olympus, Phaselis and Termessus,⁵⁷ and in the meantime the city of Syedra in Pamphylia prepared an inscription announcing that they were against the pirates⁵⁸.

Another query rising from these successes of Rome is the location where the pirates, who were originally settled in Olympus, Phaselis, Coracesium and environs, could have resettled (outside Crete) as a result of their defeats. Following the successful campaign

⁴⁹ Regarding the convenience of the channel between the Cilician coastline and Cyprus for this purpose, see Ormerod 1924, 199; Regarding the extent of piracy and its danger level, see Maroti 1970, 489 ff.; de Souza 1999, 97 ff.

 $^{^{50}}$ For the activities of Sulla in Anatolia, see Badian 1964, 157 ff.

⁵¹ Rome exerted heavy taxes and fines in Anatolia and the living conditions of the people provide us with clues regarding their warmer connections with bandits and pirates: in other words, why their numbers increased; see App. Mith. 63; Plut. Sulla 25 and Lucullus 20; Cic. Verres. Acc. I. 76; Cic. De Imp. Cn. Pomp. VI, 14-15, 31 ff.

For the peoples supporting or not supporting the Pontic State following the victory of Mithridates over Rome, see McGing, 1986, 110 ff. For more information on the collaboration of the Cilician pirates with Mithridates in this period to build an alliance, see op. cit. 139; Rostovtzeff 1953, 948; Ormerod 1924, 211 ff.; App. Mith. 63, 92.

⁵³ Arslan 2003, 95.

⁵⁴ Adak 2004, 27 ff.; Adak 2006, 118.

As Seleuceia on the Calycadnus and the area extending to its east are known to be Seleucid territory, they are thought to be distant from piratical activities (Rauh 1997, 268 ff.). However, when Tigranes occupied the Seleucid territory in 83 B.C., the Seleucid State lost all her power and control, thus paving the way for an insecure East Mediterranean. Therefore, it is not possible to consider the Seleucid State as a security mechanism against piracy in all periods. For the occupation of Tigranes and further developments, see Magie 1950, 296, 338 ff.; Sullivan 1990, 102 ff.

⁵⁶ Sherwin-White 1976, 10 ff.

⁵⁷ For the battles fought on the east cost of Lycia, see Ormerod 1922, 40 ff.; Sherwin-White 1976, 12.

⁵⁸ De Souza 1997, 477 ff.

of Servilius Vatia⁵⁹, while the fight between Rome and Pontus continued in the interior of Anatolia, it is known that the pirates retained their presence and constituted a threat to Rome along the southern coasts⁶⁰. However, their base in Rough Cilicia has not been identified yet. On the other hand, accounts of Strabo regarding the pirates contain bits of information suggesting the presence of piracy in the Olba region, thus giving some clues regarding the new bases of at least some of the pirates after the campaign of Servilius Vatia, and also suggest warming relations between some Olba people and pirates of Rough Cilicia, even that they may have acted together.

The Issue of Corycus

Strabo is the most important source providing information on piracy in the Olba region. However, although Strabo stated sharply the connection between the Olba region and the pirates, the modern literature approaches it sceptically. On the other hand, there is a suggestion that the information given by authors like, above all, Strabo and Plutarch and Appian was reported directly or indirectly from Poseidonius⁶¹. In case this claim is true, the events personally witnessed and recorded by Poseidonius (135-51 B.C.), an intellectual dominating the entire Mediterranean world, were cited by authors like Strabo, Appian and Plutarch. Thus, the accounts of Strabo regarding piracy in the Olba region gain in importance. This important issue is pushed behind the debates on the localisation of Corycus mentioned in Sallust⁶² and Strabo⁶³ and other sources⁶⁴.

The main issue in the debates of localisation for Corycus is that the ancient sources confused Lycian Corycus with Cilician Corycus and commented on Lycian Corycus as if it were the Cilician Corycus. The same debates also state that the main core region of the pirates comprised Lycia–Pamphylia and western Rough Cilicia. Besides, basing the discussion on the fact that Servilius Vatia Isauricus never set foot in Rough Cilicia, the opinion started to prevail that the areas extending east of Anemurium, and east of Calycadnus or Coracesium, according to the arguments by various authors, were to be kept out of discussions about piracy through the ages⁶⁶. Despite the lack of security in Rough Cilicia following the campaign of Servilius Vatia, the presence of pirates here has not been questioned properly.

Strabo's lines constitute another highly debated point on the issue of Corycus. However, reading Strabo's lines carefully one will notice that the information regarding Corycus is not faulty⁶⁷. The real issue with him is that he first mentions Elaiussa Sebaste in Rough

⁵⁹ About the ancient sources providing information about the campaign of Servilius Vatia, see Ormerod 1924, 216 n.1.

⁶⁰ For the events after this campaign, see Arslan 2003, 99 ff.

⁶¹ On Poseidonius and citations from his work see Strasburger 1965, 40 ff.

⁶² Sallust Hist. I.130, II.81.

⁶³ Strabo XIV.V.7.

⁶⁴ Keyser 1997, 65.

⁶⁵ Ormerod 1922, 44; Ormerod 1924, 215; Keyser 1997, 76.

⁶⁶ MacKay 1968, 89; Mitford 1980, 1237; MacKay 1990, 2087; Rauh 1997, 269.

Many scholars state that Strabo made mistakes about this point; however, none of the mistakes has been debated as much as the localisation of Corycus. For comments on this and other issues considered to be mistakes; see Trampedach 2001, 269 ff.

Cilicia, a close neighbour of Corycus⁶⁸, and then he returns to Lycia and refers to the pirates' castle of Zenicetes in Olympus, Phaselis and Lycian Corycus⁶⁹. After this short digression, he resumes his narration about Cilicia⁷⁰.

Indeed these passages do not contain contradictory or refuting statements. The point of confusion is the presence of a settlement called Corycus both in Lycia and Cilicia. This point has been considered a "mistake" by modern scholars⁷¹. However, in the paragraph on Lycia in the midst of description of Cilicia, Strabo mentions the Mount Olympus where the castle of the pirate leader Zenicetes was positioned and from where entire Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia and Milyas could be seen and that Corycus, Phaselis and many other cities in Pamphylia were under the control of Zenicetes. Finally Strabo states that Servilius Vatia conquered all these sites. The claim that Servilius Vatia entered Rough Cilicia or Plain Cilicia does not belong to Strabo⁷².

Thus, it is seen that Strabo did not make a faulty statement in the paragraph on Lycia inserted amidst Cilicia but rather, this paragraph did not belong to here⁷³. Besides, his statement that Servilius Vatia captured the sites under the control of Zenicetes provides us with important information because he says that one of these sites was Corycus. However, as Servilius Vatia never stepped his foot in Rough Cilicia the Corycus mentioned must not be sought after in Rough Cilicia. Indeed, Strabo describes in detail the geographical proximity of Olympus and Lycian Corycus, thereby demonstrating his knowledge on that geography⁷⁴. Strabo further mentions that he met in person with Servilius Vatia, thus creating the impression that he knew well the events of the period⁷⁵. All these point to the fact that Corycus mentioned is the Lycian Corycus, not the one in the Olba region⁷⁶. Indeed, Strabo spared a special passage for Cilician Corycus mentioning the principal aspects of the settlement⁷⁷. In case he wished to establish a link between Cilician Corycus and Servilius Vatia or Zenicetes, then one would normally expect that information here in this passage.

⁶⁸ Strabo XIV.V.6.

⁶⁹ Strabo XIV.V.7.

⁷⁰ Strabo XIV.V.8 ff.

⁷¹ For scholars and their tendencies as to whether Corycus mentioned in the ancient sources should be looked for in Lycia or Cilicia, see Ormerod 1924, 215; Magie 1950, 1168 ff.; Keyser 1997, 64, 71.

⁷² This claim was proposed by some modern scholars. For more information on the topic, see Jordan 1887, 1 ff.; Maurenbrecher 1891, 68; Ramsay 1928, 47 ff.; Penna 1963, 5 ff.; Garbugino 1986, 31 ff. For many other scholars who do not agree, see Magie 1950, 1169-71.

⁷³ Treuber 1886, 187 n. 2; Ormerod 1922, 43 ff.; Magie 1950, 1168. This paragraph should have been placed between XIV.III.10 and XIV.IV.1; see Keyser 1997, 67.

Trabon XIV. III. 8: "The Chelidoniae are likewise thought to lie approximately opposite to Canobus; and the passage thence to Canobus is said to be four thousand stadia. From the promontory Hiera to Olbia there remain three hundred and sixty-seven stadia; and on this stretch lie, not only Crambusa, but also Olympus, a large city and a mountain of the same name, which latter is also called Phoenicus. Then one comes to Corycus, a tract of sea-coast." Strabo, who knew the geography of the region so well, also informs us about the presence of the fortress of Zenicetes, the pirates' leader at Olympus, Strabo XIV.V.7. Therefore, it is inferred that he knew that Corycus in Lycia was a natural pirate centre.

⁷⁵ Strabo XII.VI.2.

⁷⁶ Adak 2004, 27 ff.

⁷⁷ Strabo XIV.V.5.

The Capture of the Olba Kingdom by the Pirates

In the accounts by Strabo, another point worth noting, as interesting as the localisation of Corycus, is that Olba's Priest Dynasts were once captured by tyrants and pirates. However, the discussions have concentrated so much on the localisation of Corycus that the capture of Olba Kingdom has been heavily neglected. Especially an anecdote noted by Strabo talking about the capital Olba presents very curious points⁷⁸:

"...And still above this and Soli is a mountainous country, in which is a city Olba, with a temple of Zeus, founded by Ajax the son of Teucer. The priest of this temple became dynast of Cilicia Tracheia; and then the country was beset by numerous tyrants, and the gangs of pirates were organized. And after the overthrow of these they called this country the domain of Teucer, and called the same also the priesthood of Teucer; and most of the priests were named Teucer or Ajax. But Aba, the daughter of Xenophanes, one of the tyrants, came into this family by marriage and herself took possession of the empire, her father having previously received it in the guise of guardian..."

If all of what is told in this passage is not mere imagination, this means that the capital of the Olba Kingdom was dragged into serious chaos about the first quarter of the first century B.C.⁷⁹. To comment shortly on this passage: Aba's father, Xenophanes possibly conducted a coup and usurped the power. The same Xenophanes is defined as one of tyrants and the tyrants are said to have organised the pirates. Following the eradication of tyrants and pirates, the official rulers came back to power but Aba married into the dynasty⁸⁰. In the same passage Strabo also writes that Marc Antony and Cleopatra awarded the Olba region to Aba in return for her kindness⁸¹.

At the beginning of the 20th century, epigraphic materials were discovered that bear witness to the presence of some tyrants who usurped the rule of the Olba Kingdom⁸². Thus, the information provided by Strabo is seen to be credible, not imaginary.

Strabo, again, writing about Elaiussa Sebaste located in the Olba region comments that this region is extremely well suited for piracy and that the Romans decided that the region should be ruled by kings not Roman governors⁸³. In another passage Strabo underlines: "... and they [Romans] decided that the above mentioned piracy was due to the incompetence of the rulers, although they were ashamed, since they themselves had ratified the hereditary succession from Seleucus Nicator, to deprive them of it"⁸⁴.

It is worth noting that Strabo cites the name of Seleucus Nicator because Strabo wished to draw attention to the territory in Rough Cilicia once under the control of the Seleucids; otherwise, he could have easily used another criterion instead of this particular name. The only piece of land in Rough Cilicia that stayed under the Seleucid rule uninterruptedly since the time of Seleucus Nicator was the "eastern Rough Cilicia" belonging to the Olba

⁷⁸ Strabo XIV.V.10.

⁷⁹ For more information on this topic, see Durukan 2001, 332.

⁸⁰ For marrying of Aba, former pirate princess, into the dynasty, see Jones 1971, 207.

⁸¹ For more information on this topic, see Magie 1950, 434, 494 and 1144 n. 23.

⁸² Keil - Wilhelm 1931, 64, inscription nr. 62; MacKay 1968, 92. These inscriptions will be explored below.

⁸³ Strabo XIV.V.6.

⁸⁴ Strabo XIV.V.2.

Kingdom. And its rulers who ascended the throne hereditary were the priest dynasts of Olba. These priest dynasts ruled semi-autonomously under the hegemony of the Seleucid State⁸⁵. The territory of Rough Cilicia extending west of the Olba region was conquered by the Ptolemies in the beginning of the 3rd century B.C. and stayed under their control most of the time except for brief interruptions⁸⁶. In central and western Rough Cilicia, the political tides continued so up to 188 B.C. after which a period of chaos started⁸⁷.

As seen, Strabo returns to the piratical activities in the Olba region again and again and from this standpoint, the connection of the Olba region with piracy becomes clearer. In particular, considering the possible age of Aba, her father Xenophanes should have usurped the Olba throne and collaborated with the pirates about 80–70 B.C. 88. These dates overlap with the dates of Servilius Vatia's successful campaign into Lycia, Pamphylia and Isauria (78–74 B.C.). At the end of Servilius Vatia's campaign, the pirates were defeated, decreased in numbers, lost their territories and fled before the Roman army 89. Two critical questions rise at this point:

- 1. Did all the surviving pirates go to Crete?
- 2. Is the appearance at about the same date of the tyrant Xenophanes in the Olba region related with all these? Or is it a mere coincidence?

Meanwhile, in the first quarter of the 1st century B.C. another development is noteworthy for the Olba Kingdom. Philip I and his son Philip II, among the last rulers from the Seleucid dynasty, took refuge in the Olba region and lived here for a while⁹⁰. Although this event points to the continuity of the relations between the Seleucid State and the Olba Kingdom, the Seleucids did not have any control over Olba any more. Finally, first the Armenians and then the Romans stepped onto the Cilician Plains, thus breaking the land connection of the Seleucids with Rough Cilicia⁹¹. However, the facts that Philip I and his son Philip II took refuge in Olba and that they lived here for a while could have risen from their strong connections with the administrators of Olba⁹². Furthermore, the fact that Philip I and Philip II were in exile while they were in the Olba Kingdom suggests that Olba was a strong and safe place in those years.

Although seemingly disconnected from each other, the accounts of Strabo regarding the tyrants in Olba and the epigraphic and historical evidence pointing to the presence of Philip II in the Olba region are in fact complementary and provide very serious evidence.

Brandt claims that Olba was fully independent; see Brandt 1992, 69. On the other hand, Durugönül defines the condition of Olba as semi-independent; see Durugönül 1998, 110. This definition fits Olba better. Indeed, Greek-influenced architecture, the introduction of Greek as the writing language, and introduction of Greek deities for worship indicate an important Hellenising period during which Olba was most probably influenced by the Seleucids, both politically and culturally.

⁸⁶ Jones 1971, 198 ff.; Grimal, 1984, 157.

⁸⁷ Durukan 2005a, 6 ff.

⁸⁸ The rule of Olba region was given to Aba by Marc Antony and Cleopatra in 41 or 37/36 B.C., see Magie 1950, 434, 1144, n.23; MacKay 1968, 99.

⁸⁹ Arslan 2003, 103.

⁹⁰ Mackay 1968, 91.

⁹¹ For more information on the relation of Armenian King Tigranes with the Seleucids, and on the occupation of the Cilician Plains by Armenia which was shortly followed by the onset of Roman rule in the region through the activities of Lucullus, see Magie 1950, 296; Sullivan 1990, 102 ff.; MacKay 1968, 91; Green 1990, 553.

⁹² MacKay 1968, 92.

The most interesting point of this issue is the support of the epigraphic evidence from the period of Philip II for the accounts of Strabo on tyrants and pirates. In light of the information for the reign of Philip II and archaeological evidence from the Olba region, the connection of the Olba region with the pirates starts to become clear.

The first information of importance is the ascension of Philip II to the Seleucid throne in 67 B.C. with the support and acquiescence of the Romans⁹³, which points to the good relations between Philip II and the Romans.

The second information of importance is the fact that kingdoms in Rough Cilicia were entrusted to local rulers, as told by Strabo. This bears importance for it signifies the fact that the Olba Kingdom had been turned over to the local rulers officially.

The third piece of information is the account of Strabo regarding the appearance of tyrants in Olba. Therefore, the official administration in the Olba region was thrown down by tyrants who also organised the piracy.

The fourth and the most important bit of information comes from the inscriptions proving that the Olba Kingdom was usurped by tyrants who were later overthrown. One of the inscriptions contains the title $\phi i\lambda o \rho \omega \mu \alpha i o \varsigma$ for Philip II for his friendliness with the Romans⁹⁴ and tells that a person called Hermias removed a tyrant in the Olba region⁹⁵.

[Βασιλ]εὺς Φίλιππος [υἰὸς β]ασιλέως Φιλίπ-[που] φιλορώμαιος Έρ-

- 4 [μίαν] Μίμμιος τὸν μαν[ι] [άκ]ην ἀπὸ χρυσῶν ἑ [κα]τὸν προαναβάντ[α]
 εἰς τὸ πορμ[..] κ[α]ὶ φο-
- 8 νεύσαντα τῆς φρουρᾶς δύο καὶ τὸν τύρανῖνον ἀνδραγαθίας, καὶ ἐχρημάτισεν σύν-
 - 12 τροφον.

It is important that Philip II is recorded as a friend of Rome in this inscription. This is important not only for the prestige of Philip II but also for implying the fact that Rome made use of Philip and his circle in the struggle against the pirates and the tyrants in the Olba region. Furthermore, it is also possible to read this inscription in the sense that "Philip II collaborated with the Olba priests and their supporters and the tyrants were removed thanks to this collaboration". Then this suggests that the priest dynasts of Olba were also friends with Rome and that there indeed existed an alliance of three parties. Besides, this inscription also proves the existence of tyrants, and of the power they wielded as enemies of the official administration and Rome.

⁹³ Magie 1950, 297; Downey 1963, 70.

⁹⁴ Keil - Wilhelm 1931, 64 inscription nr. 62.

⁹⁵ MacKay 1968, 92; MacKay 1990, 2088.

At the end of this inscription, Hermias is honoured by Philip II as $\sigma\acute{v}\nu\tau\rho\phi\phi\varsigma$ (comrade)⁹⁶. The intimacy level of this relation is a sign for the support of Philip to Hermias and the importance of the mission accomplished. As inferred, Philip II had a highly esteemed position in the Olba region⁹⁷. Taking into consideration the chaotic environment in the Olba region and the prestige of Philip II there, it is inferred that the Seleucid State was one of the most useful allies of Rome in this period.

In another inscription, Priest Dynast Xenophanes honours Hermias for his chivalry⁹⁸:

Άρχιερε[ὺς μέγας Ζηνοφάνης]

- 2 Ζηνοφάνου τοῦ [Ζηνοφάνου Ἑρ]μίαν Μίμμιος τὸν [ἑαυτοῦ ἐξάδελ]-
- 4 φον ἀνδρα[γαθίας].

The Hermias mentioned in this inscription also had a father called Mimmios, which suggests that the former Hermias and this one are indeed one in the same person.

Considering the approaches in both inscriptions, Hermias was possibly very close to the priest dynast⁹⁹. By overthrowing the tyrant, Hermias satisfied both Philip II and the Olba priest dynast.

Taking into account the inscriptions nrs. 62 and 63 published by Keil and Wilhelm as well as the accounts of Strabo, it is seen that the tyrant, who was the father of Aba and who usurped the throne, bore the same name as many dynasts from the priest dynasty: Xenophanes. In other words, there is a similarity of names. Although there is not enough information on tyrant Xenophanes, i.e. father of Aba, it does not seem very likely to conclude that he was a member of the ruling dynasty based on the accounts of Strabo¹⁰⁰. Besides, there is no information about the name of the tyrant overthrown by Hermias, about the number of tyrants that ruled and about the events that took place in Olba in the period of the tyrants.

Another inscription casting light on this period defines Olba priest dynast Xenophanes as ὁ φίλος τῶν βασιλέων meaning "the friend of kings" ¹⁰¹.

[Άρχιε]ρεύς μέγ[α]ς [Ζηνοφάνης Ζηνο]-

- 2 φάνου τοῦ Ζην[οφάνου ὁ φίλος τῶν (?)] βασιλέων Τρέβε[μιν (?) τοῦ δεῖνα]
- 4 'Ολβέα τὸν ἑαυ[τοῦ - - ἀρετῆς] καὶ εὐνοίας ἦ[ς ἔχων διατελεῖ].

⁹⁶ Keil – Wilhelm 1931, 66; Magie 1950, 269.

⁹⁷ For the possibility that Philip II was brought up in the Olba region, see MacKay 1968, 92. In the years when his father Philip I took refuge in the Olba region, it is inferred that he established strong friendships; see Magie 1950, 269.

⁹⁸ Keil – Wilhelm 1931, 67, inscription nr. 63.

⁹⁹ The word used by Xenophanes for addressing Hermias is not fully legible. Keil and Wilhelm completed this word as *exadelphos*, meaning "nephew" but taking into account the former inscription which also has a similar content, this word can also be completed as *syntrophos*, meaning "comrade". I would like to thank Prof. Dr. M. Adak for his comments.

MacKay's interpretation on this issue does not overlap with the accounts of Strabo; see MacKay 1968, 99.
However, Strabo is the only source about it.

¹⁰¹ Keil – Wilhelm 1931, 66-67, inscription nr. 64. For more information on the topic, see also MacKay 1968, 92.

Keil and Wilhelm are of the opinion that the kings mentioned in this inscription were Philip I and Philip II. This opinion is supported, above all by the fact that the priest dynast Xenophanes and Philip II honoured the same person in line with their common interests.

It is difficult to consider the cited events as happening consecutively merely by accident. Firstly, it is very curious that tyrants and pirates appeared in the Olba region right after the campaign of Servilius Vatia into Lycia, Pamphylia and Isauria against the pirates because, although not a few of the pirates and bandits had run away before Servilius Vatia, he succeeded in annihilating many of them.

This campaign cleared Lycia, Pamphylia and Isauria of the pirates to a serious level. The fleeing pirates moved their principal base to Crete, but in the same period the Olba Kingdom fell into the hands of tyrants. Regardless of whether these events were linked to each other or not, it is clearly seen from the accounts of the ancient sources and epigraphic materials that the Olba region had a serious potential related with piracy. Furthermore, the fact that the power had passed into the hands of tyrants and that the pirates had organised themselves indicates a lack of an authority over the Olba region and vicinity. Thus, this period not only reflects the incapability of the Romans and the Seleucids in the region but also indicates the presence of favourable conditions for the emergence of piracy.

Historical information and epigraphic evidence also provide us with information about the policy Rome may have pursued against the tyrants in the Olba region and thus the pirates.

In this author's view, Rome collaborated with Philip II most probably in order to make use of his high position in the Olba region. As a matter of fact, there is information that in 67 B.C., Marcius Rex, the proconsul of Cilicia, paid an official visit to Antioch and financed the construction of a very luxurious palace and a grand circus¹⁰². Scholars who have examined why the Romans financed such grand construction projects, which were unparalleled in this chaotic period, have proposed various opinions. Some scholars claim that this visit was paid in order to propose collaboration against the Cilician pirates, while some others claim that this was a goodwill visit on the occasion of Philip II's ascension to the throne¹⁰³. However, the date of the visit was 67 B.C. and this date more likely suggests a collaboration agreement against the pirates¹⁰⁴. This is the date when Pompey launched his renowned campaign against the pirates.

At this date Rome had the power to easily annihilate the Seleucid State, which had already exhausted its political and military mission, but preferred not to annex for the time being this geography that would bring financial and administrative problems. Understanding the capacity of Philip II that could be exploited against the pirates, Rome preferred establishing collaboration with him pursuing a diplomatic way. This capacity of Philip must be his regional prestige and his administering power over the local powers¹⁰⁵. Through this collaboration Rome wore her protective and friendly mask and was able

Downey 1937, 146 ff.; Downey 1951, 155.

For proposals on the purpose of the visit of Marcius Rex, see Downey 1937, 147; Downey 1951, 154 ff.; Downey 1963, 70-71.

¹⁰⁴ Downey 1951, 156-57.

The most important proof for this issue is the inscription from the Olba region. In this inscription, the Olba's priest dynast defines himself as the friend of Philip I and Philip II, see Keil – Wilhelm 1931, 66-67, inscription nr. 64.

both to give positive messages to her allies¹⁰⁶ and to prevent the piratical activities in the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

The developments in the Olba region correspond with the reign of Philip II; thus it can be suggested that the collaboration between Marcius Rex and Philip II also included the piratical activities in the Olba region. Indeed, Philip the Philoromaios¹⁰⁷, as understood from the inscription from the Olba region, had a great part in the eradication of the tyrants and pirates. Not much is known about the quality of this role. Although presence of logistics, financial or military aids is not known, the close connections of Philip with the official administrators and the synergy thus built up were the principal determinative element in the normalisation of the political situation in Olba. Besides, the inscription presented above that states that Hermias, known from epigraphic evidence, overthrew the tyrant, also states that Philip II announced Hermias as his comrade; this suggests that Philip was in the centre of the struggle against tyrants and pirates. In case there was no connection between Philip and Hermias then the king would have never done such an honouring for Hermias. Therefore, the figure of Hermias is the most important clue solidifying the contribution of Philip¹⁰⁸.

Thus, Rome took the situation under control by "remote controlling", thanks to the contributions of Philip II¹⁰⁹ and such an approach is entirely in conformity with Rome's overall policy¹¹⁰.

Consequently it is possible to suggest that the agreement between Marcius Rex and Philip II was built around "alliance against piratical activities in the Olban and Syrian geography". The essential element of this alliance was Philip himself, who solved the issue with his own methods. Indeed during the entire period no military invention of Rome in this region is known. Probably this is why the piratical activities in the Olba region did not draw much attention as in the other regions.

The Reflection of the Events to the Architecture of the Period in the Olba Region

Toward mid-2nd century B.C., a curious contrast is reflected especially in the architectures of the Olba Kingdom (eastern Rough Cilicia) and central Rough Cilician cities. As mentioned above, archaeological evidence in the cities in central Rough Cilicia goes into stagnation as of this date¹¹¹. However, in the Olba region the developments show the opposite and the 2nd century B.C. can be defined as "an architectural revolution process" for the Olba Kingdom. In addition to the strong defence system of the region, the most splendid religious and civic buildings as well as the first mausolea are dated to this century.

¹⁰⁶ Downey 1951, 157.

¹⁰⁷ Keil – Wilhelm 1931, 64, inscription nr. 62.

Hermias was also honoured by the Olba priest Zenas; see MacKay 1990, 2088 n. 170. This suggests a collective work.

¹⁰⁹ Downey 1963, 70.

For Rome's policy to control the region by entrusting the rule to local kings and her ambivalent policies toward these kingdoms, see Sands 1908, 71; Stevenson 1939, 1 ff.; Magie 1950, 281.

¹¹¹ Durukan 2007, 241; Durukan 2005a, 10.

This difference observed between central Rough Cilicia and eastern Rough Cilicia presents us with hints regarding the politics of the Hellenistic period and regarding the connections between the Rough Cilician people and the pirates.

Important architectural activities are observed in two periods in Olba. The first is in the 2nd century B.C. and observed in the entire Olba region, covering essentially the defence systems with the support and guidance of the Seleucids¹¹². The second period covers from the late 1st century B.C. to the early 3rd century A.D. with increasing architectural activities¹¹³.

Both periods of extensive architectural activities in the Olba Kingdom are represented by strong architectures reflecting the characteristics of their periods. Between the two periods is a hiatus lasting roughly from the early 1st century B.C. to the beginning of the Roman Imperial period. The first part of this hiatus corresponds to the period of extensive piratical activities in the entire Mediterranean, while its second half corresponds to the civil wars between Pompey, Caesar, Octavian and Marc Antony.

Each of the two architectural periods has its own characteristic fabric, easily distinguished from the other, but the hiatus is not represented with any architectural feature or monument. This hiatus observed in the Olba Kingdom is reminiscent of the hiatus observed in central Rough Cilician cities as of mid-2nd century B.C.

Indeed the first half of the 1st century B.C. is characterised by similar difficulties for the entire Asia Minor. Thus, it is normal to observe an architectural stagnation in the Olba Kingdom. However, the reason for the stagnation to the north of the Taurus Mountains is identified as the Mithridatic Wars, while it is understood that for the area to the south of the Taurus Mountains, the main problem was the pirates, the allies of Mithridates.

Thus, it is seen that the Olba Kingdom also had her share from the pirates who ravaged most of the Mediterranean. And this period partially overlaps with the above-mentioned period of architectural stagnation.

Conclusion

Although the pirates came from various geographic regions, in Antiquity the term "Cilician" assumed identical meaning with piracy and banditry¹¹⁴. Many modern scholars have argued that the pirates' core region was especially Lycia and Pamphylia and that piracy should not be considered for central and eastern Rough Cilicia (Olba region)¹¹⁵. However, the points about Olba cited above lead to the following conclusions to be derived:

Some of the Olbans were affected by the negative developments in Anatolia during the first quarter of the 1st century B.C.; they thus formed an opposition and supported the reaction that was building up in Anatolia against Rome. Until this time there is no evidence

¹¹² Durugönül 1998, 119 ff.; Durukan 2005b, 39 ff.

The most important group of buildings displaying continuity during this period of construction is the tombs. For more information about these tombs, see Machatschek 1967; Machatschek 1974, 251 ff.; Durukan 2005c, 107 ff.; Durukan 2009 (forthcoming).

¹¹⁴ Rauh 1997, 270; Adak 2006, 117.

¹¹⁵ Ormerod 1922, 42; Rostovtzeff 1953, 784; MacKay 1968, 89; MacKay 1990, 2087; Rauh 1997, 269 ff.

for Olba's connection with the pirates; however, the archaeological evidence from the Olba region halts at this period. Regarding the same period, Strabo's accounts relate that the Olba Kingdom had been usurped by tyrants and this has been verified by epigraphic evidence today. All these indicate that some Olbans collaborated with the pirates under the leadership of the tyrants who usurped the kingdom, especially in the last years of piracy.

Rome's attitude was to contact Philip II, the Seleucid king, who had great prestige in the Olba region, and to eradicate the tyrants and pirates in Olba through him. Indeed, it is understood that Philip II contributed to the solution of the problem in coordination with Olba's priest dynasts and that a Hermias undersigned a great victory by killing the tyrant.

It is known that Philip II stayed on the Seleucid throne for a short while in 67 B.C. Thus, all these events in the Olba region should have taken place around this date. In 67 B.C., Marcius Rex, the proconsul of Cilicia, paid an official visit to Antioch and Pompey launched his renowned and successful campaign against the pirates.

As a result, following the campaign of Servilius Vatia that is thought to have finished in 75 B.C., it is inferred that some piratical gangs usurped the Olba Kingdom and continued their activities there until the Pompeian campaign in 67 B.C. Thus the period from 75 to 67 B.C. can be defined as one of the peak times of piracy¹¹⁶.

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Öz

Orta ve Doğu Dağlık Kilikia'nın Korsanlıkla İlişkisi

İ.Ö. 2 ve 1. yy.'larda oldukça güçlenmiş olan Kilikia korsanlarının hangi coğrafyada konuşlanmış olduğu uzun zamandır üzerinde tartışılan konulardan biridir. Bu makale, korsanların yayılım alanı hakkındaki görüşleri yeniden değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Günümüzde genel kabul gören anlayışa göre korsanların merkezi, yoğun olarak Lykia, Pamphylia kıyılarıdır. Korakesion kentinin bulunduğu Batı Dağlık Kilikia bölgesi de korsanların önemli merkezleri arasındadır. Orta ve Doğu Dağlık Kilikia bölgesi ise bu yayılımın dışında tutulmakta, farklı yazarlar tarafından, korsanlık faaliyetlerinin Pamphylia'nın, Anemurium'un veya Kalykadnos'un doğusuna taşınmaması gerektiği vurgulanmaktadır. Oysa Strabon'un bazı aktarımları, Doğu Dağlık Kilikia bölgesinde de korsanların varlığına işaret etmektedir. Nitekim korsanların ve korsanlığın aktif bir yapısı vardır. Gelişme döneminde, büyüyen bir yayılım alanına sahiptirler. Roma'nın hamleleri sonucunda ise korsanların yayılım alanının değiştiği ve küçüldüğü anlaşılmaktadır. Bu nedenle korsanların bütün dönemler boyunca aynı sınırlar içinde kaldıkları gibi bir kanıya kapılmak hatalara yol açacaktır.

Mihridates savaşları ve Roma'nın baskı politikası sonucu büyüyen ekonomik problemler, Anadolu'daki pek çok halk gibi, Orta ve Doğu Dağlık Kilikia halkını da Roma'ya karşı isyan noktasına getirmiştir. Hellenistik Dönem'de paralı askerlik yapan ancak Hellenistik krallıkların zayıflaması sonucu bu seçenekten de yoksun kalan Dağlık Kilikia halkı, Roma'nın Anadolu'ya yerleşmesi sonrasında korsanlık yapıp yapmamak ikilemiyle karşı karşıya kalmış ve bir seçime zorlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla, korsanlara karşı koyabilecek hiçbir gücün bulunmadığı geç Hellenistik evrede, Orta ve Doğu Dağlık Kilikia halklarının korsanlarla işbirliği yapmaması için hiçbir neden görünmemektedir. Bu gerekçelerle, korsanların doğu sınırının Pamphylia, Anemurium veya Kalykadnos civarında olması gerektiği seklindeki öneriler dayanaksız kalmaktadır.

Orta Dağlık Kilikia'nın önemli kentlerinden biri olan Nagidos'ta yapılan kazı çalışmaları, İ.Ö. 2. yy. ortalarına doğru kentin terk edildiğini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Aynı dönemde Kelenderis'te de olağan dışı bir durumla karşılaşılmaktadır. Bu merkezde Nagidos'taki kadar dramatik bir depresyon görülmese de, her türlü arkeolojik buluntunun ciddi oranda azaldığı anlaşılmıştır. İki antik kent arasındaki bu paralellik, geniş bir alana yayılan ortak bir problemin varlığına işaret etmektedir

Bu durgunluk döneminin bir benzeri, İ.Ö. 1. yy. ilk yarısında Olba bölgesinde de karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu evrede Olba Rahip Krallığında bir kaos döneminin yaşandığı ve özellikle mimari anlamda ciddi bir durgunluk dönemine girildiği anlaşılmaktadır. Bu

durgunluğun gerekçesi de korsanlığın Doğu Akdeniz'deki yayılımı olmalıdır. Bu noktadan hareketle, "Kilikia Korsanları" olarak tanımlanan topluluk içinde, Olba Rahip Krallığına mensup insanların bulunup bulunmadığı, eğer varsa hangi evrede ve hangi şartlar altında korsanlarla birlikte hareket ettikleri sorgulanmalıdır.

Olba bölgesinin Seleukoslara bağlı olduğu İ.Ö. 2. yy.'da korsanlıkla henüz ilişkisinin olmadığı anlaşılmaktadır. İ.Ö. 90 yıllarından İ.Ö. 67 yılına kadar geçen zaman diliminde ise korsanlığın yayılımı konusunda bazı ipuçları bulunmakla birlikte, bu hareketli dönemi tatmin edici ölçüde aydınlatmak mümkün olamamıştır.

İ.Ö. 78–75 yıllarında Servilius Vatia'nın başarılı Isauria seferi gerçekleşmiştir. Seferin Isauria odaklı olması, korsanların kendi amaçları doğrultusunda Isauria'dan besleniyor olabileceğini düşündürmektedir. Bu evrede korsanların batıya çekildikleri ve ana üslerini Girit'e taşıdıkları bilinmektedir. Ancak aynı süreçte, Anadolu'nun güney kıyılarında ve özellikle Olba bölgesinde idareyi korsanların ele geçirdiği yönünde bir bilgi bulunmaktadır. Bu durum son derece olasıdır çünkü Servilius Vatia'nın seferinin ardından, Kilikia Tracheia'da kalıcı bir huzur ortamı sağlanamamıştır. Korsanlık devam etmistir ve korsanların Dağlık Kilikia'nın neresinde üslendikleri tespit edilememektedir. Ancak Strabon'un aktardığı bir anekdota göre, Aba'nın babası Ksenophanes'in olasılıkla bir darbe yaptığı ve yönetimi ele geçirdiği görülmektedir. Bu aktarımda, aynı Ksenophanes tiranlardan biri olarak tanımlanmakta ve tiranların da korsanları örgütlediği ifade edilmektedir. Tiran ve korsanların yok edilip, resmi idarecilerin tekrar başa geçmesinin ardından, Aba'nın evlilik yoluyla hanedana dâhil olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Strabon'un bu aktarımlarıyla ilgili olarak, Olba Rahip Krallığının idaresini ele geçirmiş olan tiranların varlığını kanıtlayan epigrafik belgeler bulunmuştur. Dolayısıyla Strabon'un bu konuda verdiği bilgilerin gercek olduğu ve bir senaryo üretmediği anlaşılmaktadır.

İ.Ö. 1. yy. ilk çeyreğinde meydana gelen bir diğer gelişme, Seleukos hanedanının son üyelerinden Philip I ve oğlu Philip II'nin Olba topraklarına sığınmış ve bir süre burada yaşamış olmalarıdır. Olba bölgesinde, Philip II dönemine ait olan yazıtlarda, Strabon'un tiranlarla ilgili anlattıklarını destekleyen bilgiler bulunmuştur. Bu yazıtlarda, Olba Rahip Krallığının tiranlar tarafından ele geçirilmiş olduğuna ve daha sonra tiranların tasfiye edildiğine dair bilgiler yer almaktadır.

Aynı dönemde birbiri ardına meydana gelen bu olayları bir tesadüfler zinciri olarak yorumlamak zordur. Servilius Vatia'nın Lykia, Pamphylia, Isauria bölgelerini kapsayan seferinin hemen ardından, Olba bölgesinde tiran ve korsanların ortaya çıkmış olması ilginçtir çünkü Servilius Vatia çok sayıda korsan ve haydudu ortadan kaldırmış olmasına rağmen, kaçanların sayısı da az değildir.

Lykia, Pamphylia, Isauria bölgeleri bu seferin ardından korsanlardan temizlenmiştir. Kaçan korsanların ana merkez üssü Girit'e taşınmış ancak Olba Rahip Krallığının tiranların eline geçmesi de aynı dönemde gerçekleşmiştir. Tiran ve korsanların varlığı, Olba bölgesi ve çevresinde oluşan otorite boşluğunu göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla bu süreç, Seleukosların ve Roma'nın bölgedeki acizliğini anlatmakla birlikte, korsanlık için uygun koşulların ortaya çıktığına da işaret etmektedir.

Tarihi bilgiler ve ele geçen yazıtlar, Olba bölgesindeki tiran ve korsanlara karşı Roma'nın izlemiş olabileceği siyaset hakkında da ipucu vermektedir. Roma, "olasılıkla", Philip II'nin Olba bölgesindeki etkin pozisyonundan yararlanmak için onunla işbirliğine gitmiştir.

Nitekim İ.Ö. 67'de, Kilikia prokonsülü Marcius Rex'in Antiochea'ya resmi bir ziyaret gerçekleştirdiği ve çok görkemli bir saray ile çok görkemli bir circus inşaatını finanse ettiği konusunda bilgiler bulunmaktadır. Bu kaotik döneme ait başka örneği olmayan bu ölçüdeki inşaat faaliyetlerinin Roma tarafından neden finanse edilmiş olabileceğini yorumlayan araştırmacılar, bazı farklı önerilerde bulunmuşlardır. Kimi araştırmacılar, Kilikia korsanlarına karşı bir işbirliği teklif etmek üzere bu ziyaretin gerçekleştirildiğini düşünürken, Philip II'nin tahta çıkışı nedeniyle yapılmış bir iyi niyet ziyareti olduğunu iddia eden kaynaklar da bulunmaktadır. Ancak, içinde bulundukları İ.Ö. 67 yılı dikkate alındığında, korsanlara karşı bir anlaşma yapıldığı önerisi daha olası görünmektedir. Bu tarih, Pompeius'un korsanlara karşı düzenlediği ünlü seferinin de tarihidir.

Roma, politik ve askeri misyonu sona ermiş olan Seleukos Devleti'ni kolaylıkla ortadan kaldıracak güce sahipken, kendisine finansal ve idari anlamda problem yaratacak olan bu coğrafyayı şimdilik bünyesine katmamıştır. Philip'in korsanlara karşı kullanılabilecek bir özelliği olduğunu anlayan Roma, diplomatik bir yöntem izleyerek Philip II ile işbirliği yapmayı tercih etmiştir. Philip'in bu önemli özelliği, bölgedeki prestiji ve yerel güçler üzerindeki yaptırım gücü olmalıdır. Bu işbirliği sayesinde Roma, koruyucu ve dost maskesini takarak, hem müttefiklerine olumlu mesajlar vermiş, hem de korsanların Akdeniz'in en doğusundaki faaliyetlerinin önüne geçmiştir.

Bu gelişmelere dayanarak, Marcius Rex ile Philip II arasındaki anlaşmanın, "Olba ve Suriye coğrafyasındaki korsanlık faaliyetlerine karşı ittifak" çerçevesinde şekillenmiş olabileceği önerilebilir. Bu ittifakın temel unsuru Philip'tir ve kendi metotları ile konuyu çözüme kavuşturmuştur. Nitekim yaşanan süreç boyunca, Roma'nın Olba bölgesine askeri bir müdahalesi bilinmemektedir. Olasılıkla bu nedene bağlı olarak, Olba bölgesindeki korsanlık faaliyetleri, diğer bölgelerde karşılaşılan korsanlık faaliyetleri kadar dikkat çekmemiştir. Sonuç olarak İ.Ö. 75-İ.Ö. 67 yılları arasında, korsanların Olba bölgesinde aktif oldukları anlaşılmaktadır.




Fig. 1 The Southern Coast of Anatolia