

ADALYA



SUNA-İNAN KIRAÇ AKDENİZ MEDENİYETLERİ ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜ
SUNA & İNAN KIRAÇ RESEARCH INSTITUTE ON MEDITERRANEAN CIVILIZATIONS

ADALYA



SUNA-İNAN KIRAÇ AKDENİZ MEDENİYETLERİ ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜ YILLIĞI
THE ANNUAL OF THE SUNA & İNAN KIRAÇ RESEARCH INSTITUTE ON MEDITERRANEAN CIVILIZATIONS

ADALYA
Vehbi Koç Vakfı
Suna - İnan KIRAÇ Akdeniz Medeniyetleri
Araştırma Enstitüsü Yıllık Dergisi
Yönetim Yeri: Barbaros Mh. Kocatepe Sk. No. 25
Kaleiçi 07100 Antalya Tel: +90 242 243 42 74
Faks: +90 242 243 80 13 E-posta: akmed@akmed.org.tr
Yayın Türü: Yerel Süreli Yayın
Sayı: XIV - 2011

Sabibi: Vehbi Koç Vakfı Adına Erdal YILDIRIM
Sorumlu Müdür: Kayhan DÖRTLÜK
Yapım: Zero Prodüksiyon Ltd., İstanbul
Abdullah Sokak No. 17
Taksim 34433 İstanbul
Tel: +90 212 244 75 21 Faks: +90 212 244 32 09
Baskı: MAS Matbaacılık A.Ş.
Hamidiye Mh. Soğuksu Cd. No: 3 Kağıthane - İstanbul
Tel: +90 212 294 10 00 info@masmat.com.tr Sertifika No: 12055

Bilim Danışma Kurulu / Editorial Advisory Board

Hâluk ABBASOĞLU	Max KUNZE
Ara ALTUN	Thomas MARKSTEINER
Oluş ARIK	Wolfram MARTINI
Cevdet BAYBURTLUOĞLU	Gönül ÖNEY
Tuncer BAYKARA	Mehmet ÖZSAİT
Jürgen BORCHHARDT	Urs PESCHLOW
Jacques Des COURTILS	Scott REDFORD
Vedat ÇELGİN	Denis ROUSSET
Nevzat ÇEVİK	Martin Ferguson SMITH
Bekir DENİZ	Oğuz TEKİN
Refik DURU	Gülsün UMURTAĞ
Serra DURUGÖNÜL	Burhan VARKIVANÇ
Hansgerd HELLENKEMPER	Michael WÖRRLE
Frank KOLB	Martin ZIMMERMAN

Adalya, **A&HCI** (Arts & Humanities Citation Index) ve
CC/A&H (Current Contents / Art & Humanities) tarafından taranmaktadır.

Adalya is indexed in the **A&HCI** (Arts & Humanities Citation Index) and
CC/A&H (Current Contents / Art & Humanities).

Hakemli bir dergidir / A peer reviewed Publication

Editörler / Editors

Kayhan DÖRTLÜK
Tarkan KAHYA
Remziye BOYRAZ SEYHAN
Tuba ERTEKİN

İngilizce Editörleri / English Editors

İnci TÜRKOĞLU
Dorin LUCAS

Yazışma Adresi / Mailing Address

Barbaros Mah. Kocatepe Sk. No. 25
Kaleiçi 07100 ANTALYA-TURKEY
Tel: +90 242 243 42 74 • Fax: +90 242 243 80 13
akmed@akmed.org.tr
www.akmed.org.tr

ISSN 1301-2746

İçindekiler

Gülsün Umurtak	
<i>Understanding the Hacılar II Settlement</i>	1
Mustafa Bulba	
<i>Kaunos Demeter Kayalığından ele geçen Kıbrıs Heykelticikleri</i>	17
Alice Landskron	
<i>Zur Komposition der Friese auf der Nord- und Ostseite des Heroons von Trysa</i>	31
Christian Marek	
<i>Kaunos und Lykien</i>	57
Alime Çankaya – Hüseyin Köker	
<i>Dumancık Kistophor Definesi</i>	63
Ümit Aydınoglu – Ümit Çakmak	
<i>A Rural Settlement in the Rough Cilicia-Isauria Region: Karakabaklı</i>	71
Fatih Onur	
<i>Gagates: θαυμάσιος λίθος</i>	
<i>Antikçağ'da Meşhur bir Taşın Kullanım Alanları ve Yataklarının Yeriyle İlgili</i>	
<i>Bir Değerlendirme</i>	103
Julian Bennett	
<i>Why did Claudius Annex Lycia?</i>	119
Murat Durukan	
<i>Olba Teritoryumunda Hellenleştirme ve Romalılaştırma Politikalarının Arkeolojik İzleri</i>	137
Murat Arslan – Nihal Tüner Önen	
<i>Akdeniz'in Korsan Yuvaları: Kilikia, Pamphylia, Lykia ve Ionia Bölgelerindeki</i>	
<i>Korykoslar</i>	189
Gürkan Ergin	
<i>How to Transform an Isaurian into a Subject? The Roman Army as a Foucaultian</i>	
<i>Technology of Power</i>	207
Burhan Varkıvanç – Hülya Kökmen	
<i>Attaleia'nın Anıtsal Mezarları Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler</i>	223
N. Eda Akyürek Şahin	
<i>Antalya Müzesi'nden İki Hekateion</i>	237
Hüseyin Sami Öztürk – Hakkı Emirhan Süel	
<i>Tloslu Ptolemaios'un Mezar Yazıtı</i>	259

Mehmet Özsait – Guy Labarre – Nesrin Özsait	
<i>Nouvelles inscriptions et monuments de la vallée d'Apollonia (Phrygie-Pisidie)</i>	267
Serra Durugönül	
<i>Silifke Müzesi'nden Dionysos-Pan Heykeli ve İki Torso</i>	287
İnci Delemen	
<i>The Colossal Statue of Lucius Verus Recently Discovered in Perge</i>	297
Ayşe Aydın	
<i>Side Müzesi'ndeki Sigma Formlu Tabla</i>	315
Altan Çetin	
<i>Memlûklerin Kıbrıs ile İlişkileri</i>	327

How to Transform an Isaurian into a Subject? The Roman Army as a Foucaultian Technology of Power

Gürkan ERGİN*

The subject of Isaurian banditry in southern Anatolia is a well-known and thoroughly studied phenomenon¹. Although modern historians have commented on the role of the Roman army in the Romanization process of the Isaurians, how this process exactly worked has not been fully investigated. Scholars barely touch upon the exact mechanisms of Romanization in the army life. For example, Feld, who has written the most recent and comprehensive account of the Isaurian banditry, devotes only two pages to the army's role in the Romanization of the Isaurians². Haynes, who focuses on the auxiliary soldiers' exposure to Roman cultural style in the army in his short discussion, emphasizes the Roman auxiliaries' diverse cultural background, and shows that through common religious activities and the promotion of literacy they came to admire and benefit from the advantages the Roman army offered³. This paper, on the other hand, attempts at a fresh view of the matter in the light of Michel Foucault's views on power, discipline and subjectivity, focusing on how the recruiting for the army, organisation of the camp, drills and military duties affected such marginalized and rural contingents like the Isaurians, and transform them into "subjects".

Michel Foucault (1923-1984), a social historian, philosopher and cultural critic, had published several books before he was given a chair in the Department of History of Systems of Thought of at the Collège de France, the most prestigious academy in France. The pre-Collège de France works include *Madness and Civilization* (1961), *Birth of the Clinic* (1963), *The Order of Things* (1966). Then came *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and *History of Sexuality* (1976-1984). His numerous articles and interviews were collected by his assistants under the title *Dits et écrits* (1994).

Foucault is especially interested in the social structures, institutions and the individual. It is in this relationship that we can analyse power⁴. He resists the idea that the power is

* Dr. Gürkan Ergin, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Edebiyat Fakültesi, Tarih Bölümü, Eskiçağ Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, Ordu Cad. 196 Laleli 34134 İstanbul. E-mail: gurergin@istanbul.edu.tr

¹ I do not intend to give a full account of the events. Major modern works include Yanguas 1977; Shaw 1990, Lenski 1999a, b; Feld 2005. Yanguas diverges from by claiming that the disturbances in the region are indicators of a separatist movement (Yanguas 1977, 371).

² Feld 2005, 104-105.

³ Haynes 1999.

⁴ For a detailed discussion of Foucault's theory of power see Kelly 2009, 30 ff.

something a group of people or an institution possesses. Instead, it is performed rather than possessed and it is not necessarily a repression of the powerless by the powerful. On the contrary, it can be productive, giving rise to new forms of behaviour, rather than simply closing down or censoring certain types of behaviour. It is a strategy, not a single entity, but a network of power relations. Foucault's aim was to depart from the then prevailing Marxist view of power and examine the way the power operates within everyday relations between people and institutions. This allows an analysis which focuses on individuals as active subjects and agents rather than passive dupes⁵.

According to Foucault, in order to eliminate the resistance completely, the "unpredictability" factor should be removed first. This can only be done if one has the means of controlling people on a neural level or anticipating their behaviour. These are impossible by today's standards, but there are indeed some developments in the respect that emerge from the use of technologies of power, namely *discipline* and *bio-politics*. For the former, which is *micropolitical* and the oldest such method, we have schools, factories, armies or prisons, all of which seek to control and train men's bodies. The latter method, *macropolitical*, seeks to constitute a population through mass surveillance (the census etc.) and mass control (health campaigns etc.). These methods contradict with the sovereign power to some degree, since they do not operate simply through violence but by training people and keeping them alive respectively⁶. Psychology, sociology or computer modelling are technologies, for example, which can predict the behaviour of the people or the individual and thus reduce unpredictability.

The Roman army was the single most important aspect of the Roman Empire that works on a micropolitical level. As will be shown below, it operated as a productive technology of power, which aimed at the discipline and integration of the subject. Although it is true that, as Lenski points out, the Isaurian hinterland had already semi-urbanised settlements when the Romans came and there are enough architectural, archaeological and epigraphical data to suggest integration with the Hellenic culture, we need not to think that the whole population was necessarily urbanized⁷. However, it is rather difficult to determine the number and the extent of any pastoralist/transhumant settlements, since they are located high on the mountains and were built mostly of organic materials⁸.

I will not go into the details of the nature of the events in Isauria and their consequences here. But the majority of the scholars speak of a constant tension between the mountain/rural population and those in plain, or between the sedentary and the nomadic peoples of Isauria⁹. While the presence of a tension between the two modes of life is undeniable, we should not accept it as a constant fact. Indeed, as Hobsbawm, Braudel and Bintliff point out, they are inevitably depend on each other¹⁰. Thus, the urban and the rural populations were closer to each other than the sources imply. There is also the question of the marked urbanisation in the area in the Late Republic and Early Empire.

⁵ Mills 2003, 34.

⁶ Kelly 2009, 43.

⁷ Lenski 1999a, 431 ff.

⁸ Yakar 2007, 178 ff.

⁹ Roueché 2007⁴, 576; Lenski 1999b, 418; Hopwood 1983, 1986, 1989, 1999.

¹⁰ Hobsbawm 1997, 103-104; Braudel 1994, 99-121; Bintliff 1996, 131.

We should always be sceptical about whether the intense urbanisation of the region under the *Pax Romana* would always naturally lead to integration. In this paper, I use the term “Isaurians” to mean people who are not urbanised in the common sense, and whose principal living space were the rural or mountainous areas¹¹. With regard to the subject of the paper, it is the army itself, rather than any urban setting, where the power operates through the social body. And this is why we see seventeenth century cities laid out according to a Roman camp plan (see below).

The answer to the question how “a people of bandits and rebels”, a label often applied to the Isaurians, could one day enter the upper echelons of the Roman society and even create an emperor that is Zeno, from a former Isaurian warlord will be explored within this framework. The Roman army was one of the major powers in the transformation of rebels into subjects and political actors¹². The recruitment of Isaurians from the late second century on ultimately resulted in their integration with the existing power network thanks to its function as a Foucaultian technology of discipline¹³.

In order to fully understand and appreciate how the Roman army may have operated in such a way, we might look at the modern armies of the seventeenth century, which used what we can identify as Foucaultian technologies of power as a means of integrating a marginalized or rural population into the military body. Foucault suggests that from the seventeenth century on, power gained new attributes that separated it from what he terms as the “negative power”, which we encounter in the traditional political theories. The traditional power before the seventeenth century is defined as *juridico-discursive* (i.e. the sovereign power) by Foucault and includes a system of sovereignty, laws, prohibitions and submission¹⁴. The seventeenth century witnessed the appearance of another model of power replacing the negative and limiting juridico-discursive model in which the

¹¹ That the recruits from Isauria or other parts of Anatolia came from the Romanized or central settlements is not necessarily true. An auxiliary soldier should always have been able to give his *civitas* as *origo*. When he did not do so, but appeared solely with his name, one may perhaps suspect that he was one of the *dediticii*, i.e. people formally surrendered to Rome (whether after a fight against Rome or not) and who were now at the disposal of the Roman authorities. These people gained rights of a Roman citizen only after they were given the status of a *peregrinus*. However, an auxiliary soldier might have not always become a *peregrinus*. The men from Thrace, for example, who appear in diplomas merely as “Thrax”, may suggest that they were *dediticii*, for the interior of Thrace had not yet been parcelled out among the *civitates* created by Trajan and Hadrian, and its inhabitants will still have been *dediticii* (Mann 1986: 187-189). Similarly, by looking at the military diplomas one cannot claim that the Isaurians in the army were always Roman citizens from cities or towns. Like Thracians, there might have been rural Isaurians in the auxiliary regiments, whose uncertain status was ignored by the Roman authorities.

¹² Recruiting nomads or rural population into the Roman army, initially for service only in the Roman auxiliary regiments was a well-established phenomenon by the High Empire. Probus (AD 276-282), for example, insisted that the male children of the veterans, whom he settled in Isauria should join the army at the age of eighteen, in this case “in order that they never might learn to be brigands” (SHA *Prob.* 16.6).

¹³ Lenski 1999a, 437-438. Actually, the fact that auxiliary *diplomata* record very few Isaurians might point to their limited presence in the Roman army before AD 140, when the *diplomata* were effectively ceased to be issued. However, it is likely that the regiments raised by Trajan in AD 112-114, namely cohorts I Ulpia Galatorum, cohorts II Ulpia Galatorum, cohorts I Ulpia Paphlagonum, cohorts II Ulpia Paphlagonum and cohorts III Ulpia Paphlagonum, contained Isaurians. For these regiments see Spaul 2000, 392-396. Isaurian units existed in the reign of Theodosius I (AD 346-395), named felices Theodosiani Isauri (ND *Or.* 5). Cohors I Isaurorum sagittaria (ND *Or.* 7), legio II Isauria and legio III Isauria (ND *Or.* 29) were probably established in the 380's. In 535 there were 3000 Isaurians under the command of Belisarius, when he landed in Italy (Procop. *Vand.* 5.2). In 575 Justin II used Isaurian auxiliaries in his campaign against Persia (Feld 2005, 341). Yanguas suggests that some of the Isaurians captured during the events narrated by Ammianus might have been recruited as auxiliaries (Yanguas 1977, 371).

¹⁴ Keskin 2005², 11-24.

sovereign had been a decisive factor on the right to live. This model, on the other hand, is positive and productive in the way that it aims to increase the capacity of life instead of limiting it. Today this model still operates, but it now uses the technologies of power, that is discipline and bio-politics.

In the eighteenth century, when this new kind of power, i.e. the bio-power was becoming prominent in Europe, what I will identify as Foucaultian aspects of the Roman army were taken as a model by the European states to create a new type of army, which aimed at social discipline and the creation of the ideal citizen. In this respect, the pioneering movers were several humanist philologists, particularly the Dutch Justus Lipsius, who, in 1590's, wrote *Fax Historica*, and two other works, namely *de militia Romana* and *Polorceticon* that he excerpted from it. These are based on the information from ancient authors like Tacitus and Polybius, and deal with the military organization, weapons, tactics, techniques and siege warfare¹⁵. They helped to create a neoclassical army with an emphasis on drill and discipline, these methods being applied by Holland. These Dutch-originated military ideas and practices were soon adopted by the German princedoms, France, England, Spain and later on the Ottoman Empire. In creating the "modern army", one of the main aims of the European states was to control and employ those sections of society marginalized by a threat from a foreign political power and/or the monopolization of power and wealth in the existing system. For example, Spain sought to discipline and drill her famous mercenaries (*tercio*) of the fifteenth-seventeenth centuries with inspiration from Greek and Roman military literature¹⁶. Thus this "Frankish drill", to use the Ottoman term, meant nothing more than the taming of the labour force and its power or violence within a mandatory working regime and so alienate it from physical owner to serve the state¹⁷.

This new army model was proved to be effective when introduced into the Ottoman Empire and one can find striking parallels between Roman-inspired and Ottoman practices. The traditional Janissary army of the Ottoman Empire, which had increasingly become a serious threat to internal stability, was disbanded in 1826. Having been modelled on its counterparts in the above-mentioned European countries, the new army's behaviour towards the civilians of the Ottoman Empire was more restrained and proper compared to that of the Janissaries. And unlike the Janissaries, the soldiers in the new Ottoman army paid for the things they bought from the marketplace, did no harm to the civilians, and abstained from robbery and unrest¹⁸. This observed change in the behaviour of the new Ottoman soldiery can be compared with a passage of Zosimus, where he describes Theodosius' attempts to integrate the Scythians into the late Roman army. En route to Egypt, a Scythian unit meets up with some Egyptian soldiers at the marketplace of Philadelphia in Lydia. When one of the Scythians refuses to pay for his purchases and then injures the shop owner, the Egyptians, who are very polite to the civilians, tell him that this is an improper act for a man who wants to live under Roman laws, and then a

¹⁵ Yıldız 2009, 318.

¹⁶ Ibid. 317.

¹⁷ Ibid. 326.

¹⁸ Ibid. 348.

fight breaks out¹⁹. Zosimus' passage clearly reveals the army's function as an institution for the discipline of individuals. For the (probably) illiterate future soldiers of rural origin, who lacked "self-discipline", army drill was a "civilising process". At least one man in the new unit of Scythians had yet to learn this, but Zosimus and the Egyptian soldiers, and the shop owner at Lydian Philadelphia, were accustomed to expect a different way of behaviour from a member of the Roman army.

A similar perception of discipline present amongst Isaurian soldiers is evident in Procopius, albeit in a slightly indirect manner. When Procopius describes how the Isaurian garrisons in Italy betrayed towns to the Goths, he does not relate their behaviour to their origin as Isaurians²⁰. Clearly, once an Isaurian was recruited by the army, he became in the eyes of many a person who was divorced from his bandit background and was transformed into an ordinary subject. Indeed, Elton claims that malicious actions initiated by the Isaurians in the late Roman army do not differ from the actions of contemporary regiments raised from other ethnic backgrounds and observes that although Isaurians formed an important part of the sixth-century Roman army, the contemporary authors did not single them out from other infantry contingents such as Thracians or Illyrians as being any better or worse behaved²¹. It is also worth noting that, while Ammianus Marcellinus labels the Isaurians as a warlike people, in books V and VI of his *History of the Wars*, Procopius do not apply this term to the Isaurian soldiers²². Thus, as an institution for the creation of "docile bodies", to use Foucault's terminology, the Roman army had certain distinctive qualities, which provided inspiration for the creation of the armies of the early modern period.

The "supervision of soldiers via the smallest fragments of their life and bodies", to quote Foucault, is a distinguishing aspect of the early modern armies of the seventeenth century and later, and also of the Roman army²³. It manifests itself through a system of enclosure, partitioning, ranking and serialization²⁴. According to Foucault, "power is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms"²⁵. Through the techniques mentioned above, the Romans partly succeeded in concealing the application of the "power". These aspects are obvious at first glance from Polybius' account of the Roman military system and legionary camp planning as set out in Book VI of his *Histories*. But before considering this, we should turn to Foucault. His chapter titled as "Docile Bodies" in his *Discipline and Punish* deals specifically with this matter in the military context²⁶. Through the technique of *enclosure* it became possible to assemble men under a single roof, prevent theft and violence, dissipate the peoples' fears of marauding troops, prevent conflict with civic authorities, stop mass desertion and manage expenditure. But enclosure by itself is neither sufficient nor constant in disciplinary machinery and this is where *partitioning* takes

¹⁹ Zos. 4.30.4.

²⁰ Procop. *BG* 7.20.4-16

²¹ Elton 2000, 297, 299.

²² Amm. Marc. 14.2.1.

²³ Foucault 1995², 140.

²⁴ Reid 2008, 68.

²⁵ Foucault 1978, 85.

²⁶ Foucault 1995², 142-147.

place: The place of every individual must be known and there is a tendency to create as many sections as there are elements or bodies to be distributed to completely eliminate any imprecise distributions, uncontrolled disappearances, diffuse circulations, unusable and dangerous coagulations. The aim of partitioning was to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering and using. Discipline organizes an analytical space²⁷. Thus knowledge is the key here as it allows reducing unpredictability and this is one aim of the Roman legionary camp with its carefully and systematically divided sections as described by Polybius:

The manner in which they form their camp is as follows...They place then the tents of these all in one line parallel to the side of the square selected and fifty feet distant from it, to give room for the horses, mules, and baggage of the tribunes... The tents of the tribunes are at an equal distance from each other and at such a distance that they extend along the whole breadth of the space occupied by the legions. They now measure a hundred feet from the front of all these tents, and starting from the line drawn at this distance parallel to the tents of the tribunes they begin to encamp the legions, managing matters as follows. Bisecting the above line, they start from this spot and along a line drawn at right angles to the first, they encamp the cavalry of each legion facing each other and separated by a distance of fifty feet, the last-mentioned line being exactly half-way between them. The manner of encamping the cavalry and the infantry is very similar, the whole space occupied by the maniples and squadrons being a square. This square faces one of the streets or viae and is of a fixed length of one hundred feet...Behind the last tent of the tribunes on either side, and more or less at right angles to these tents, are the quarters of the cavalry picked out from the extraordinarii, and a certain number of volunteers serving to oblige the consuls. These are all encamped parallel to the two sides of the agger, and facing in the one case the quaestors' depot and in the other the market. As a rule these troops are not only thus encamped near the consuls but on the march and on other occasions are in constant attendance on the consul and quaestor... The whole camp thus forms a square, and the way in which the streets are laid out and its general arrangement give it the appearance of a town. The agger is on all sides at a distance of 200 feet from the tents, and this empty space is of important service in several respects. To begin with it provides the proper facilities for marching the troops in and out, seeing that they all march out into this space by their own streets and thus do not come into one street in a mass and throw down or hustle each other²⁸.

²⁷ Ibid.143.

²⁸ Polyb. 6 27-33. The origins of the Roman camp are somewhat obscure. Frontinus states that Romans had used to make their camps in the fashion of Punic huts grouped together and distributed the cohorts "here and there" until Pyrrhus (280-275 BC), who first positioned the entire army in an entrenchment. The Romans then adopted the practice from him after they had captured his camp near Maleventum (Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.14). Livy agrees that the Romans learned the method of encampment from Pyrrhus (Liv. 35.14.8), but Plutarch claims that Pyrrhus was amazed at the discipline, order and general arrangement of the Roman camp (Plut. *Pyrr.* 16.5).

The Roman camp as Polybius describes it, corresponds to a Foucaultian perfect camp, in which

*all power would be exercised solely through exact observation; each gaze would form a part of the overall functioning of power. The old, traditional square plan was considerably refined in innumerable new projects. The geometry of the paths, the number and distribution of the tents, the orientation of their entrances, the disposition of files and ranks were exactly defined; the network of gazes that supervised one another was laid down... The camp is the diagram of a power that acts by means of general visibility*²⁹.

This ideal partitioning schema as provided by the orderliness of a Roman camp was also commented on by ancient authors, who described the Roman *castrum* as a beehive, a geometrically perfect and rationally divided space³⁰: it is an authoritarian utopia populated by identical members who for the good of all. However, it also has an aspect that can be described in terms appropriate to an urban setting. Like Polybius, Josephus observed that

*the camp is intersected by streets laid out in a regimented way, and the officers' tents are located in the centre, and right in the middle of these is the general's headquarters, like a small temple. It is as if a town has appeared on the spur of the moment, with a market place, a quarter for workmen, areas where the tribunes and centurions can hold court, if there are differences to be settled*³¹.

Foucault noted how the military theoreticians of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century revived the idea and the model of the Roman camp, applying this to the fortified towns of Kristiania, Gothenburg and Richelieu³². He also notes that "in the case of towns constructed in the form of the camp, we can say that the town is not thought of on the basis of the larger territory, but on the basis of a smaller, geometrical figure, which is a kind of architectural module, namely the square or rectangle, which is in turn subdivided into other squares or rectangles"³³. Thus the camp is an ideal place, in which those unused to urban life such as nomadic pastoralists could get accustomed to urban setting.

However, to ensure this process operates in a satisfactory way in military bases or towns there is the need for the rule of *functional sites* as within the architectural setting of the complex left generally at the disposal of several different uses. So, particular places were defined to correspond with the need to supervise the population and to break dangerous communications, but also to create a useful space. Foucault observes this process especially in naval and military hospitals in ports, which "are - with their circulation of goods, men signed up willingly or by force, sailors embarking and disembarking, diseases and epidemics - a place of desertion, smuggling, contagion: they are crossroads for dangerous mixtures, a meeting-place for forbidden circulations"³⁴. It appears that this

²⁹ Foucault 1995², 171.

³⁰ Verg. *Georg.* 4.198-199; Varro *Rust.* 3.16.9; Sen. *Clem.* 1.19-2-3.

³¹ Joseph. *BJ* 3.82-84.

³² Foucault 2009, 15.

³³ Ibid. 16.

³⁴ Foucault 1995², 144. Vitruvius also saw harbour as a morally dangerous place, advising that any community that wished to have a temple of Venus should build this in the harbour area "in order that the young men and

function of the hospital was not fully exploited in the Roman Empire³⁵. Nevertheless, the Roman army did have hospitals (*valetudinaria*) in some of their auxiliary forts such as Vindolanda and most of their legionary fortresses (Inchtuthill, Neuss etc.). As the Roman legions developed and learned to deal with isolated locations, which made it impossible for the wounded to be evacuated to a safe Roman fort or allied town, they began to build *valetudinaria*, which would serve this function. They were Rome's answer to isolation³⁶. The *valetudinarium* in Neuss, located in the Lower Rhine, is the first excavated and a well-known building of its kind. It is interesting to note that its layout with a number of small rooms or wards divided by small hallways that would aid in keeping the rooms quiet, was similar to the plan of German civilian and military hospitals of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries³⁷. The buildings in legionary fortresses had a courtyard surrounded on three sides by an inner row of small rooms. The inner ring of rooms opened to a small hall, rather than onto the larger central hall. All these arrangements were made to "treat, but in order to do this it must be a filter, a mechanism that pins down and partitions; it must provide a hold over this whole mobile, swarming mass, by dissipating the confusion of illegality and evil"³⁸. The medical supervision of diseases and contagions, therefore, is inseparable from a whole series of other controls: military control over deserters, fiscal control over commodities, administrative control over remedies, rations, disappearances, cures, deaths etc. The location of *valetudinarium* away from the other buildings in the camp and the arrangement of the rooms as separate spaces divided by walls might indicate a degree of individualization of the sick and the wounded. A physician could check each patient as he walked along the long halls on the sides. Thus, the whole body of the sick and the wounded could be analysed in individual units. The layout of the hospital and the manner it imposes the methods of treating the patients, seems to be a continuation of the practice of power on bodies in the other areas of Roman camp life.

The technology of *ranking* as a means of disciplining and organising a body of men is naturally visible in the Roman army. Discipline is actually

an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations... In discipline, the elements are interchangeable, since each is defined by the place it occupies in a series, and by the

married women may not become habituated in the city to the temptations incident to the worship of Venus" (Vitruv. 1.7.1).

³⁵ The modern medicine fixed its dates of birth as being in the last years of the eighteenth century. In a Roman hospital the patient was not the object of power. "For clinical experience to become possible as a form of knowledge, a reorganization of the hospital field, a new definition of the status of the patient in society, and the establishment of a certain relationship between public assistance and medical experience, between help and knowledge, became necessary; the patient has to be enveloped in a collective, homogeneous space. It was also necessary to open up language to a whole new domain: that of a perpetual and objectively based correlation of the visible and the expressible" (Foucault 2003³, 196). Vegetius tells that in the case of plague or a disease, a military camp should be removed to another place, instead of filtering the sick (Veg. Ep. 3.2). Likewise, the attitude that a doctor's duty is to deal with the individual not to involve in what we call the public health was common in the Roman Empire. There were no medical officers of health or environmental inspectors (Nutton 2000, 71).

³⁶ Scarborough 1968, 259.

³⁷ Baker 2009, 15.

³⁸ Foucault 1995², 144.

*gap that separates it from the others. The unit is, therefore, neither the territory (unit of domination), nor the place (unit of resilience), but the rank: the place one occupies in a classification, the point at which a line and a column intersect, the interval in a series of intervals that one may traverse one after the other*³⁹.

The methods of the Roman military with regard to ranking were another feature of the neoclassical revival. For example in the eighteenth century, Jesuit colleges had classes of 200-300 pupils subdivided into groups of ten, each with a “decurion”, and placed in “Roman” or “Carthaginian” camps⁴⁰. The whole interaction in a college was, therefore, based on the ranking system of a Roman legion. Ranking, hence the chain of command is also what distinguishes *latronicum*, the bandit band, from soldiery:

*When military discipline has been defiled even once, the soldier will not obey his tribune nor the tribune his legate, nor the legate his consul, nor the master of horse his dictator. No one would have respect for men or gods, or for military commands. Soldiers would wander without leave in peace and in war; careless of their military status they would go wherever they wished, idiosyncratically, and they would not distinguish day from night, favourable from unfavourable terrain, but would fight whether ordered to do so or not by their general, and they would not cleave to standards or their posts: it would all be blind and by chance like banditry, not like the solemn and sacred rites of war*⁴¹.

Thus, the process of ranking within the military sphere must have had a profound effect on those Isaurians who joined the Roman army, coming as they did from a pastoral or transhumant life style with -if anything at all- a quite different hierarchical organization.

All of the above-mentioned aspects of bio-power deal with organization of space and its imposition over the individual. Accompanying them is the *control of activity*. One of its methods is the *time table* which was employed to a degree in the Roman army and the early modern armies. It has three great methods: to establish rhythms, to impose particular occupations and regulate daily cycles and repetition. As Foucault notes, chronological orientation of everyday life is very much an innovation of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the life in the Roman army was certainly more time regimented in other areas of contemporary life, Josephus being amazed at how the Roman soldiers followed a schedule *en masse*⁴². As Phang points out, this was unusual for the classical society as a whole and although we have military daily and weekly duty rosters from Dura, Vindolanda and Egypt, they are not exactly comparable to the chronological schedules of schools, hospitals and factories as observed in the seventeenth-century Europe⁴³. The closest thing to chronological regimentation we find in the Roman world seems to be the regular night watches⁴⁴.

³⁹ Foucault 1995², 145.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 146.

⁴¹ Liv. 8.34.7-1.

⁴² Joseph. *BJ* 3.85.

⁴³ Phang 2008, 213.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 215-216.

At this point, I believe, an example from the nineteenth century may better illustrate the above-mentioned aspects of Foucaultian power with regard to an army. This is the army reforms of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha, who became the governor of Ottoman Egypt in 1805 and later rebelled against the Ottoman Empire. Since his reforms were based on those of the early modern armies of Europe, and especially of France (he was an admirer of Napoleon and his Grand Army), which in turn had adopted the Roman model to create an army based on what we can identify as the Foucaultian notions of bio-power. Mehmed Ali Pasha was a powerful governor and a far-sighted reformist, who is traditionally regarded as the founder of modern Egypt and whose dynasty remained power for the next 150 years. One of his most remarkable reforms was applied to the army, which proved to be very efficient against both the rebellions within the Empire and the Ottomans themselves. The effectiveness of Mehmed Ali Pasha's army came from the use of trained units and a modern ranking system, these adopted from the French army in particular. The manpower for this new army was provided by the levies from the countryside and Mehmed Ali Pasha tested the new techniques of discipline on these recruits. The central problem faced by Mehmed Ali Pasha and the military authorities was the resistance to conscription, sometimes expressed through armed rebellion, of which we know of two examples during his reign⁴⁵. This is, incidentally, how the Cennatae in the Taurus reacted against the Roman *census* in AD 32⁴⁶. Alternatively, such resistance could be achieved in a non-violent way by the villagers deserting their homes; a method used by the Thracians in AD 26⁴⁷.

The point is that despite the great efforts by the Egyptian government at implementing conscription through the levy, the authorities were aware that a coherent policy was inoperable without information regarding the size of the population, its age composition, the location of the individuals, their occupation etc. and these data could only be collected by a census which along with other tools like time tables, training manuals, and medical reports, could break time and space into similar, comparable and abstract units⁴⁸. The training manuals, for instance, do this for the human body by breaking it down to uniform and measurable movements that can be standardized down to the inch. Once these techniques were put into practice, "time would no longer be measured in terms of the temporal space a given act occupies, but in abstract, quantifiable units of hours, minutes and seconds"⁴⁹. The Roman army, through its system of training and discipline, took precisely the same approach to its recruits, whether conscripts or volunteers. This would mean a radical change in the lifestyle of those recruits that were conscripted from the mountain tribes or villages of Isauria, since they were now expected to adapt a new notion of time and space in the Roman army instead of their traditional perceptions based, for example, on harvesting or pasturage seasons. Such fundamental changes on the daily lives of rural or nomad population would naturally cause resistance against the Roman authorities -just as it did in the villages of nineteenth-century Egypt. At least at the outset, it is doubtful whether the men and their families distinguished military service from *corvée* labour.

⁴⁵ Fahmy 2002, 99.

⁴⁶ Tact. *Ann.* 6.41

⁴⁷ Ibid. 4.46.

⁴⁸ Fahmy 2002, 103-107.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 108.

The first step in imposing a new life style on the recruits was to isolate them from their habitual environments and create as much difference as possible between their old life and the military life. Like Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Romans were aware of that and at least until the second century, the soldiers were not allowed to possess a garden in, and a farmstead outside the camp, to marry and to trade⁵⁰. When the army was based on a city, it was often separated from the civil space by the existence of a separate military camp, but in some cases in city or countryside; the soldiers were billeted on private houses⁵¹. In the Ottoman Egypt (and also Crete, Cyprus and Syria), the technique of enclosure was most needed in the countryside, since the army's uncontrolled contact with the civilians during the march created problems⁵². Similar events are known from the history of the Roman Empire, and especially the Late Empire. Apart from literary sources' references to the problem, there are a number of inscriptions from Anatolia, for instance, which preserve petitions and empire's responses to them and which repeatedly refer to vagabond soldiers who left the main army route and looted nearby villages⁵³. Abuses of soldiers were not limited to the countryside: Byzantium was pillaged by Gallienus' soldiers and Tyana barely escaped the same fate⁵⁴.

Of course, the Roman army had obvious shortcomings compared to the early modern armies. Rationalization as an assertion of power was not apparent. Close-formation drill and military uniforms, for example, were less evident in the Roman army than the armies of the early modern period, and formation as a spectacle and discipline were not strictly imposed⁵⁵. This is not surprising, since the pre-seventeenth-century soldier was someone who

could be recognized from afar; he bore certain signs: the natural signs of his strength and his courage, the marks, too, of his pride; his body was the blazon of his strength and valour; and although it is true that he had to learn the profession of arms little by little - generally in actual fighting - movements like marching and attitudes like the bearing of the head belonged for the most part to a bodily rhetoric of honour; the signs for recognizing those most suited to this profession are a lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, a small belly, thick thighs, slender legs and dry feet, because a man of such a figure could not fail to be agile and strong; when he becomes a pike bearer, the soldier will have to march in step in order to have as much grace and gravity as

⁵⁰ Ibid. 117.

⁵¹ MacMullen 1963, 145; Bennett 2007, 143-144. It is a fact that marriage ban did not prevent soldiers from taking wives. Nonetheless, according to Phang, it defines soldier's active sexual role. The Roman soldier asserted his masculinity via penetration (rape, seizure) or enslaving female captives. (Phang 2008, 93-94). Phang sees the separation of the soldiers from the women as establishing and securing of masculine *habitus*, a term she borrows from Pierre Bourdieu.

⁵² Fahmy 2002, 121-122.

⁵³ Tact. Hist. 1.63-66; SHA Tyr. Trig. 18.6, Aurel. 7.5; Hauken 1998, 35-58, 74-140, 141-162, 203-212, 215-216, 217-244, 251-258.

⁵⁴ SHA Gall. 5.8, Aurel. 24.3-25.

⁵⁵ Phang 2008, 58-59. Even so, the Roman military gear and uniforms might have attracted rural peoples such as Isaurians to army. For example, in the sixteenth century, the Albanians, who were fond of "swords, golden embroideries and military insignia", left the mountains with their families to join the armies of France and the Ottoman Empire (Braudel 1993, 62-63).

*possible, for the pike is an honourable weapon, worthy to be borne with gravity and boldness*⁵⁶.

The Roman soldier was more a figure of virtue, courage, strength and valour than a machine to be constructed or an inapt body to be shaped. This is evident, for example, in Vegetius, who praises vigour, courage and superior physical qualities in recruiting:

*The recruiting officer should diligently ensure that through a careful examination of their face, eyes, and general physical constitution, he chooses men who are likely to prove good soldiers. For many indications reveal the qualities not only of a man but also of horses and dogs... The potential young recruit therefore ought to have alert eyes, should carry his head erect, have a broad chest, muscular shoulders, strong arms, long fingers, a small waist, slim buttocks, and legs and feet that are not fleshy but sinewy and strong. When you find all these qualities in a recruit you need not pay too much attention to his height, for brave soldiers are more valuable than tall ones*⁵⁷.

By the eighteenth century, however, the soldier became “something that can be made out of formless clay: his movements and gestures were corrected, his posture were made perfect. The power ran slowly through each part of the body. It was now the object and the target of the power”⁵⁸. This does not mean that the body had not been subject to imperious and pressing investments in the Roman Empire. But the scale of control, its object and modality differed:

*It was a question not of treating the body en masse but of working it ‘retail’. It was not or was no longer the signifying elements of behaviour or the language of the body, but the economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization; constraint bears upon the forces rather than upon the signs; the only truly important ceremony is that of exercise. It implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result and it is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement*⁵⁹.

Although many of the above aspects of control had been in existence before, some of them indeed having their roots in the Roman Empire, they became general formulas of domination in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yet, compared to the standards to the antiquity in general, the achievements of the Romans in micropolitical sphere with regard to its army during the first two centuries of the Principate was so firm that the army remained a civilizing force throughout the empire. The Roman camp in particular, with its urban planning and organized life broken into measurable units, was a powerful Foucaultian technology of power, which effectively “civilized” its foreign elements like Isaurians.

⁵⁶ Foucault 1995², 135.

⁵⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 1.5.6. Similarly, Cicero sees helmet, sword and shield as a part of soldier’s body (Cic. *Tusc.* 2.37); in fact it is the armour that makes a soldier brave; without it the soldier is civilianized and effeminated (Tact. *Ann.* 13.35; Fronto *Princ. Hist.* 12 paired with Fronto, *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.1). Since unlike a medieval armour the Roman armour did not cover whole body, the stature of the soldier was important. Nevertheless, Romans were aware, as we learn from Vegetius, that these qualities should be sustained by serious training.

⁵⁸ Foucault 1995², 135-136.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 136-137.

Bibliography

Abbreviations for the ancient sources and journals follow Oxford Classical Dictionary and L'Année Philologique with minor alterations.

- Baker 2009 P. Baker, "Archaeological Remains as a Source and Evidence for Roman Medicine", *Medicana Antiqua* (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucgajpd/medicina%20antiqua/mm_essays.html)
- Bennett 2007 J. Bennett, "The Roman Army in Lycia-Pamphylia", *Adalya* 10, 2007, 131-153.
- Bintliff 1996 J. Bintliff, "The Mountain Peoples of Ancient Greece: The Relevance of World-Systems Theory and Neo-Malthusianism to Their Development", *GH* 8, 1996, 105-141.
- Braudel 1993 F. Braudel, II. Felipe Dönemi'nde Akdeniz ve Akdeniz Dünyası I, M. A. Kılıçbay (trans.) (1993).
- Braudel 1994 F. Braudel, II. Felipe Dönemi'nde Akdeniz ve Akdeniz Dünyası II, M. A. Kılıçbay (trans.) (1994).
- Elton 2000 H. Elton, "The Nature of the Sixth Century Isaurians", in: S. Mitchell – G. Greatrex (eds.), *Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity* (2000) 293-307.
- Fahmy 2002 K. Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men. Mehmed Ali, His Army the Making of Modern Egypt* (2002).
- Feld 2005 K. Feld, *Barbarische Bürger. Die Isaurier und das römische Reich* (2005).
- Foucault 1978 M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction* (1978).
- Foucault 1995 M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of Prison*² (1995).
- Foucault 2003 M. Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic*³ (2003).
- Foucault 2009 M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78* (2009).
- Hauken 1998 T. Hauken, *Petition and Response. An Epigraphic Study of Petitions to Roman Emperors* (1998).
- Haynes 1999 I. Haynes, "Military Service and Cultural Identity in the Auxilia", in: A. Goldsworthy – I. Haynes (eds.), *The Roman Army as a Community* (*Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series* 34) (1999) 165-174.
- Hobsbawm 1997 E. Hobsbawm, Eşkiyalar, O. Akalın – N. Hasgöl (trans.) (1997).
- Hopwood 1983 K. Hopwood, "Policing the Hinterland: Rough Cilicia and Isauria", in: S. Mitchell (ed.), *Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia* (*BAR International Series* 156) (1983) 173-187.
- Hopwood 1986 K. Hopwood, "Towers, Territory and Terror: How the East Was Held", in: P. W. M. Freeman – D. Kennedy (eds.), *Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East. Proceedings of a Colloquium Held at the University of Sheffield in April 1986* (*BAR International Series* 297) (1986) 343-356.
- Hopwood 1989 K. Hopwood, "Bandits, Elites and Rural Order", in: A. Wallace-Hadrill (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society* (1989) 171-189.
- Hopwood 1999 K. Hopwood, "The Links between the Coastal Cities of Western Rough Cilicia and the Interior during the Roman Period", *AnAnt* 1, 1999, 305-311.
- Kelly 2009 M. G. E Kelly, *The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault* (2009).
- Keskin 2005 F. Keskin, "Özne ve İktidar", in: F. Keskin (ed.), *Michel Foucault. Özne ve İktidar. Seçme Yazılar* 2² (2005) 11-24.

- Lenski 1999a N. Lenski, "Assimilation and Revolt in the Territory of Isauria from the 1st Century BC to the 6th Century AD", *JESHO* 42/4, 1999, 414-465.
- Lenski 1999b N. Lenski, "Relations between Coast and Hinterland in Rough Cilicia", in: E. Jean – A. M. Dinçol – S. Durugönül (eds.), *La Cilicie: Espaces et Pouvoirs Locaux (2e Millénaire Av. J.-C.-4e Siècle Ap. J.-C.)*. Actes de la Table Ronde Internationale d'Istanbul, 2-5 Novembre 1999 (*Varia Anatolica* 13) (1999) 417-424.
- MacMullen 1963 R. MacMullen, *Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire* (1963).
- Mann 1986 J. C. Mann, "A Note on Conubium", in: W. Eck – H. Wolff (eds.), *Heer und Integrationspolitik. Die römischen Militärdiplome als historische Quelle* (1986) 187-189.
- Mills 2003 S. Mills, Michel Foucault (2003).
- Nutton 2000 V. Nutton, "Medical Thoughts on Urban Pollution", in: W. M. Hope – E. Marshall (eds.), *Death and Disease in Ancient City* (2000) 65-74.
- Phang 2008 S. E. Phang, *Roman Military Service. Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early Principate* (2008).
- Reid 2008 J. Reid, "Life Struggles: War, Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault", in: M. Dillon – A. W. Deal (eds.), *Foucault on Politics, Security and War* (2008) 65-91.
- Roueché 2007 C. Roueché, "Asia Minor and Cyprus", *CAH* 14⁴ (2007) 570-585.
- Scarborough 1968 J. Scarborough, "Roman Medicine and the Legions: A Reconsideration", *Medical History* 12/3, 1968, 254-261.
- Shaw 1990 B. D. Shaw, "Bandit Highlands and Lowland Peace: The Mountains of Isauria-Cilicia", *JESHO* 33, 1990, 199-233/237-270.
- Spaul 2000 J. Spaul, *COHORS². The Evidence for and a Short History of the Auxiliary Infantry Units of the Imperial Roman Army* (BAR International Series 841) (2000).
- Yakar 1997 J. Yakar, *Anadolu'nun Etnoarkeolojisi*, S. H. Riegel (trans.) (1997).
- Yanguas 1977 N. S. Yanguas, "Algunos Problemas Sociales en Asia Menor en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo IV d. C.: Isaurios y Maratocuprensos", *HAnt* 7, 1977, 351-377.
- Yıldız 2009 G. Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok. Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti'nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum 1826-1839* (2009).

Özet

Isauria'lıları Uygarlaştırmak: Bir İktidar Teknolojisi Olarak Roma Ordusunun İşlevi

Modern çalışmalar Roma ordusunun Romalılaştırma sürecinde oynadığı önemli role sıkça değinir. Bununla birlikte, ordunun günlük yaşamı içinde Romalılaştırma ya da uygarlaştırma mekanizmalarının tam olarak nasıl işlediği üzerinde durulmamıştır. Oysa askere alma, lejyon kampının kurulması, kampın planı, nöbet vb. günlük faaliyetlerin, Roma ordusu tarafından Isauria'lıları Foucault'nun deyiimiyle “uysal bedenler” hâline dönüştürmenin ve uygar yaşama alıştırmalarının araçları olarak kullanıldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Bu süreç kanımızca en iyi şekilde ünlü sosyal tarihçi ve filozof Michel Foucault'nun yönetilebilirlik/yönetim mantığı, özne ve iktidar hakkında görüşleri ışığında değerlendirilebilir.

Roma ordusunun bazı özellikleriyle benimsendiğini düşündüğümüz “disiplin” teknolojisi Foucault'ya göre “mikropolitiktir”; yani bedenler üzerinde uygulanır. Roma iktidarı bu teknolojiyi bedenler üzerinde kontrol sahibi olabilmek ve onlardan verimli şekilde yararlanabilmek için kullanmıştır. Roma lejyon kampı bu açıdan iktidarın en önemli fiziksel temsillerinden biridir. Bu özellikleri daha sonra 17. yy.'dan itibaren kendisini gösteren yeni iktidar modelleri tarafından ideal vatandaş ve sosyal disiplin yaratma amacındaki modern Hollanda, Almanya, İspanya ve nihayetinde Osmanlı ordularına temel oluşturacaktı. Bazı Avrupa şehirlerinin Roma lejyon kampı planına göre kurulmuş olması, kampın aynı zamanda kırsal ya da göçebe kökenli askerleri şehir hayatına alıştırmaya yönelik bir amaç taşıdığını gösterir. İktidarın “gözünün” herkesi görebileceği ve konumlarını bilebileceği şekilde düzenlenen lejyon kampında, aynı zamanda birliklerin/bireylerin de karşılıklı birbirlerini gözetleyebileceği bir organizasyon söz konusudur. Bu şekilde bireyin hareketleri her daim gözetim ve kontrol altında tutulur. Kesin yerleri sabit ölçüler ve alanlarla konumlandırılmış bireylerin/birliklerin üzerinde denetim ve gözetim yapmak kolaylaşır; giriş - çıkışlar, firarlar, askerlerin sivillerle olan teması artık denetlenebilir. Bu ideal plan, antik kaynaklar tarafından da şehir planına ve tıpkı arı kovanlardaki gibi bireyin toplumun iyiliği için çalıştığı bir ütopyaya benzetilir. Lejyon kampında sıralama ve hiyerarşinin önemi büyüktür. Bunlar olmaksızın askerler hayduttan farksızdır. Nitekim 18. yy.'da bazı Avrupa okullarında öğrenciler Roma lejyonlarında olduğu gibi kamplara ve “birliklere” ayrılarak öğrenim görmüşlerdir.

Roma kampının ve onu izleyen modern ordu kamplarının bir amacı da bireyin eski hayatıyla yenisi arasında olabildiğince büyük bir fark yaratmaktır. Lejyon kampının planı, nöbetler, talim ve kampın sivil hayattan izole edilmiş konumu buna yönelik uygulama-

lardı. Kırsal kesimden gelen acemiler üzerinde uygulanan en önemli disiplin teknolojilerinden biri nöbet çizelgeleri idi. Mısır ve Vindolanda gibi yerlerden bilinen bu çizelgelerle zaman ölçülebilir soyut birimlere bölünüyordu. Kendilerini hasat zamanı ya da yaylaya çıkma dönemlerine göre ayarlayan Isauria'lılar gibi kırsal kökenli ve bir kısmı göçebe bireyler üzerinde zamanın bölünmesi büyük bir etki yaratmış olmalıydı. Aynı şekilde lejyon kampları şehir dışında kurulmuş, askerlerin evlenmesi yasaklanmış, hatta kamp içinde bile olsa bahçecilik veya tarımla ilgilenmeleri yasaklanmıştı. Nitekim, muhtemelen 2. yy.'dan itibaren askere alınmaya başlanan Isauria'lılar bir süre sonra antik yazarlarda haydutluklarıyla anılmamaya başlar; artık onlar ordunun diğer yardımcı birliklerinden farksız Romalı bireylerdir. Roma ordusunun temel ilkelerine göre biçimlendirilmiş Fransız ordusunu model alan Mısır valisi Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, bu yolla Mısır kırsalından gelen acemilerin entegrasyonunda büyük aşamalar kaydetmiştir. Aynı şekilde Yeniçeri Ocağı'nın kaldırılmasından sonra aynı ilkelere göre kurulan yeni Osmanlı ordusunun askerleri tıpkı Theodosianus'un Mısırlı birlikleri gibi aldıklarının parasını ödeyen, yağma ve başıbozukluk yapmayan bireylere dönüşmeye başlamıştır.

Lejyon hastanelerinin (*valetudinaria*) planları kampın kendisi kadar olmasa da gözetleme ve denetim temelli özellikler taşır. Bu açıdan *valetudinarium* planlarının 17-19. yy. Alman hastanelerinkine benzemesi ilginçtir. Dörtgen hastanenin duvarları boyunca izole odalarda sessizlik içinde tedavi gören hastalar, mekânlarını önündeki uzun koridorda yürüyen hekim tarafından denetim ve gözetim altında tutulur. Bu özelliğiyle hastane kamp genelindeki iktidar mekanizmasını devam ettirir ve hastalarla yararlıların giriş çıkışlarını, faaliyetlerini, tedavilerini düzenleyen, onları filtreleyen bir araç görevini görür.

Bütün bu iktidar teknolojileri doğal olarak direnişle karşılaşmıştır. Toplumun yapısı, yaşı, yerleri gibi bilgiler olmadan kırsaldan sağlıklı şekilde asker alımı yapmak zordu. İktidarın her şeyi bilmesi ve kategorik bilgi hâline getirmesinin aracı olan nüfus sayımı ya da *census* iktidarın varlığının doğrudan temsilcisiydi. Bu uygulama olmadan tutarlı bir politika izleme mümkün değildi. Dolayısıyla İ.S. 26'da Thrakia'lılar ve 52'de Toroslarda yaşayan Kennatai kavminin tepkisi iktidarın kendi bu şekilde en açık biçimiyle göstermesine yönelikti. Aynı tepkiler yüzyıllar sonra Mısır kırsalında Roma'ninkine benzer bir yol izlemek isteyen Mehmet Ali Paşa'ya gösterilecekti.

Bununla birlikte Roma ordusunun bazı yetersizlikleri de mevcuttu. Bir gösteri ve disiplin aracı olarak talim yeteri kadar gelişkin değildi. Modern ordular için asker, fiziksel özellikleri geri planda kalan, istenildiği gibi biçimlendirilebilecek bir özneyken, Romalılar için iyi bir asker fiziksel özellikleriyle kendini belli ediyordu. Yine de bunun talim ve disiplinle birlikte işe yarayacağının farkındaydılar. Her şeye rağmen, Roma ordusu antik çağ standartlarına göre disiplin ve işleyiş bakımından çok ileri bir konumdaydı. 1 ve 2. yy.'da mikropolitik alanda atılan temeller o kadar sağlamdı ki, Roma ordusu imparatorluk boyunca Isauria'lılar gibi halkları "uygarlaştıran" en önemli unsur olarak kalmaya devam etti.